


AUGUST 2, 2004

The American Conservative

THE SUN & THE DRAGON

THE FANTASY OF SINO-JAPANESE ENMITY



**The Sexual Scofflaws
Progressive Peacenik Myth
CIA's Bin Laden Expert Speaks**

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ENDANGERED SPECIES

Although I have been a fervent admirer of Pat Buchanan for decades, I must say that the column I look forward to most in your magazine is Taki's. He is, or comes across as, such an aristocrat, a species I'd thought had gone the way of the Edsel and the dodo. Unlike some possible specimens of the type (Andrei Navrozov comes to mind), Taki is unfailingly witty and never tiresome. And unlike others, he is entirely unapologetic and unsycophantic to our populist political culture. The Brahmins of Boston and Charleston have lost their nerve. They've sold off their plantations and summer chalets to bond-traders and CEOs. To my mind, you have done my country an extraordinary honor by adopting it as your own, and your columns are a great consolation and inspiration to would-be aristocrats here in the hinterlands. Please do not become British.

CHAS BAYLOR
St. Mary's, Kan.

TIME & TRAVEL

In his recent column Fred Reed makes many excellent points regarding the insular attitude of Americans (July 19). But Mr. Reed overlooks one important item: we Americans have a longer work week and fewer vacation benefits than almost any industrialized nation. I would love to mountain bike in Peru, navigate the rapids of a fast-running stream, or explore some remote spot. But with only one week of vacation a year, it is an easy choice to visit my grandson instead.

JIM KEYS
Houston, Texas

NO STRINGS ATTACHED

We have just read Pat Buchanan's interview with Ralph Nader (June 21). While Mr. Nader is entitled to his opinion, we were dismayed that a third-party candidate for the presidency would resort to the use of derogatory and hyperbolic

language. To call our national leaders "congressional and White House puppets" to Israeli interests is to play into the hands of those who would promote anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Statistics show that there are only 6,155,000 Jews in the United States out of a total population of 282,125,000. That small number of Jews, a mere 2 percent of the population, can hardly be viewed as a bloc to determine election results. Rather than relying on the anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews, Mr. Nader should have recognized the real reason behind the United States support of Israel—Israel is the only true democracy in an unstable Middle East region and the only true ally and friend on which the U.S. can rely.

STEPHEN M. FLATOW, Chairman
LORI PRICE, Director
Community Relations Committee
United Jewish Federation of MetroWest NJ
via e-mail

GIULIO VS. JULIUS

I am grateful to my friends, the editors of *The American Conservative*, for publishing E. Christian Kopff's generous review of *The Morality of Everyday Life* (July 19). The review does, however, contain a number of errors that give a misleading impression of my book.

Prof. Kopff accuses me of admiring Maritain and ignoring the European Right. One reference to Maritain does not make me an admirer, and I have long-standing contacts with the European Right. His only evidence for my ignorance is my decision to give Evola's first name in the Italian form (Giulio) rather than in the Latin form (Julius) he apparently came to prefer—at least that is what I think Kopff meant in saying I misspelled Evola's name in the text but cited it correctly in the note. It is clear from the context that I was tweaking Evola for his attempt to represent himself as a Roman rather than an Italian.

In his complaints against the centralized structure of the Catholic Church

and against Vatican II, Prof. Kopff not only contradicts himself—Vatican II was, after all, designed to decentralize the Church—but also conveys the impression that I have written a book about the Church or its teachings. This is not the case, and anyone who has read the introduction can see that I have taken as my perspective the point where Christian teaching converges on the wisdom of the pre-Christian classics. Prof. Kopff does not explain why he takes up matters so extraneous to my book, but his published animadversions against the Catholic Church may offer a clue.


THOMAS FLEMING
via e-mail

THIRD PARTY, FIRST CHOICE

A recent letter to the editor suggests that Kerry's faults make Bush the only practical choice for conservatives. On the contrary, the most practical choice for the long run is to build up the credibility of third parties so that fresh ideas (like conservative anti-imperialism) can gain a hearing. Those who wish to avoid helping Kerry should consider whether their state is one of the few states "in play" this election. If not, why not vote for the Constitution Party or any other third party that has good ideas? If third parties, collectively, could get as much as 15 percent of the total vote, the major parties would begin to incorporate some of their ideas, more states would come into play and the political climate might become more friendly to common sense.

SAM DARGAN
via e-mail

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CHRIS HIERS

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
[IDEAS]

BUCKLEY'S FINAL ACT

William F. Buckley's decision to pass on his ownership shares to *National Review's* board of directors ratifies publicly a circumstance long plain to many *NR* readers: the magazine's founder and guiding figure is well into his retirement and is no longer very involved with the magazine he launched. It is both much written and true that Buckley's magazine was crucial in transforming American conservatism into an intellectual force: for those who grew up in the 1960's, WFB was the only intellectual conservative with significant national visibility. His magazine was brave, erudite, hardly tied to the Republican Party, quirky, unpredictable, and proudly reactionary. Its development and growth was a stunning accomplishment of political journalism in the 20th century.

Despite its high subscription levels, *NR's* influence is not the intellectual force it once was. The magazine seems seldom to publish an idea that has not been previously battled around by the Republican National Committee or the various right-wing talk-show hosts. On the most vital issue facing conservatives since the Cold War—the decision of whether or not to invade Iraq (and the related question about whether American foreign policy should be synchronized with Israel's expansionist right wing)—*National Review* was both shrill and wrong.

The "old" *NR*—from its inception to roughly 1998—would not have been reluctant to open its pages to conservative writers who would have argued that sending young American men and women to invade, occupy, and "democratize" a large and fractious Arab country was a monumentally dubious idea. The new *NR* was all monochromatic jingoism and warmongering. The old *NR* would recognized the drawbacks of the United States cutting itself off from the principal



nations of the democratic West; the new *NR* delighted in mindless Europe-bashing. In William Buckley's recent columns, readers could sometimes sense his own dissent (what else should one call it?) from the current *NR* editorial line, but he never pressed the matter.

At the time of the transfer of his shares, Buckley said, "With the benefit of minute hindsight, Saddam Hussein wasn't the kind of extra-territorial menace that was assumed by the administration," adding "If I knew then what I know now about what kind of situation we would be in, I would have opposed the war." It was a stunning statement, widely noted, and could fairly be read as a rebuke to David Frum's article that had labeled antiwar conservatives as "unpatriotic" during the run-up to the Iraq invasion. Above all it was a sign that Buckley was still making waves, after more than 50 years in the intellectual spotlight.

[IMMIGRATION]

BRING US MORE POOR

The other morning the clock radio awakened us with the sound of John Kerry shouting out slogans in Spanish. It

was a report on Kerry's speech before the National Council of La Raza—a Latino pressure group whose name *en ingles* means National Council of The Race. (Wonder what would happen if the white-oriented Council of Conservative Citizens chose a name like that?)

Kerry promised the group that he favors good jobs at good wages (without, needless to say, any mention of how high immigration rates bring down wages) and then told them that he would bring to Congress an amnesty proposal for illegal aliens within the first 100 days of his administration. (Of course, much like President Bush, who has advocated similar positions, he didn't call it "amnesty" but "a path to equal citizenship" for the "good people who are undocumented.") Then Kerry promised to accelerate the overall rate of immigration—to "make sure families are reunited more quickly"—apparently concluding that one and a half million new immigrants a year doesn't swell the Hispanic population fast enough.

George W. Bush has made essentially the same proposals (plus the doozey that anyone, anywhere in the world who has a

job offer from an American company, can get a visa). So for all the talk about political polarization, one thing is clear: our multimillionaire major-party candidates are united in feeling there aren't enough poor people competing for low-wage jobs in America right now and we should import more of them, faster.

[POLITICS]

DUMP CHENEY REVISITED

Sources say that Karl Rove is attempting to line up support to convince Vice President Dick Cheney to withdraw from the Republican ticket for "health reasons." Rove's specially commissioned surveys of voter preferences reveal that Cheney is currently hurting the ticket because of his abrasiveness and the perception that he was the driving force behind the Iraq War. There have also been warnings that the investigation into the leak of CIA officer Valerie Plame's identity will soon be producing indictments, one of which will be in Cheney's office. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is expected to resign after the November elections, has been sounded out on his willingness to step up to become the vice presidential candidate if Cheney should go. Polls indicate that a Bush-Powell ticket would be an election winner. Powell reportedly indicated that he would be willing to consider the offer but only if all the neoconservatives responsible for the disaster that is Iraq were to go. The would mean the early retirement of Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith at Defense, Scooter Libby in the vice president's office, John Bolton at State, and Elliot Abrams at the National Security Council.

—Philip Giraldi

[ELECTION]

CHOICE OR ECHO?

John Kerry's choice of John Edwards to run with him was expected and logical; he adds an effective campaigner and a likeable personality that the Democrats

badly needed. It also produces a ticket made up of two men who voted to authorize the Iraq War—a fact likely to become a regular talking point for Ralph Nader in the months ahead. A key question is whether Kerry and Edwards will present serious alternatives to the Bush doctrine or will they push simply for redressed imperial policies with different personalities at the top. *TAC* will be watching closely—along with the rest of the world.

[BUDGET]

RED-INK REPUBLICANS

As federal spending zooms past \$2 trillion a year and the deficit swells to more than \$400 billion, it's clear that fiscal discipline has totally collapsed in Washington. Now Congress may fail even to pass a budget this year due divisions within the Republican majority.

The Republican leadership, in conjunction with the White House, wants to press forward with tax cuts without any commensurate reduction in government spending. They are opposed by GOP moderates whom the *Washington Post* describes as "pushing for curbs on tax cuts" and "reluctant to slash spending."

Notice that neither side takes the traditional conservative position in favor of lower taxes *and* spending. The choice is instead borrow-and-spend versus tax-and-spend.

[TAC]

VERSION 2.0

Some small but significant changes are evident with this issue. A slightly glossier cover should better display the art (a change our various artists have long been hoping for). Standard issues will be a few pages longer; there's been an upgrade in paper stock. These are indications, of course, of *TAC*'s progress, matched by some increased notice in other media forums. We hope our readers appreciate them. ■

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No Nationalists on Kemp's "Shining Hill"

"A struggle is underway for the soul of the Republican Party between a minority of protectionist xenophobes and those who are pro-trade and pro-immigration."

Thus does Jack Kemp begin a column in which he jettisons the black conservative running for Congress in North Carolina whom he earlier endorsed. Kemp accuses Vernon Robinson of "running a very negative and aggressive anti-immigration campaign ... contrary to the core values of the party of Lincoln."

Jack is right about that struggle for the soul of the party. But why is it necessary to demonize disagreement? Webster's defines xenophobia as "fear and hatred of strangers and foreigners." What evidence is there that Vernon Robinson is not a man of good heart?

Jack cites George Washington as having "famously quipped in 1788, 'I had always hoped that this land might become a safe and agreeable asylum to the virtuous and persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they might belong.'"

But, as James Fulford of VDare.com notes, Washington was talking about a persecuted Dutch community that had supported the American Revolution. Few of the illegal aliens here were victims of persecution and not all are necessarily virtuous. Their only common characteristic is that all have broken our laws.

Can Jack seriously believe the Father of our Country would have approved of amnesty for 8-14 million illegal aliens and an immigration policy that will leave America in 2050 with 100,000,000 Hispanics concentrated in our Southwest, with scores of millions not speaking English and loyal to nations not our own?

Jack says illegals come for work, not welfare. Most do. But why, then, did Jack oppose California's Prop. 187, which would have denied welfare benefits only to aliens here illegally? Why, as HUDmeister, did he hand out housing subsidies to illegal aliens?

Jack believes being pro-illegal is good politics. But Gov. Pete Wilson overcame a 20-point deficit to win re-election in 1994 by backing Prop. 187. Wilson was the last Republican to win major statewide office before Arnold, whose best issue, pollsters say, was opposition to Gray Davis's handing out driver's licenses to illegals. Even John Kerry now opposes driver's licenses for illegals.

The Dole-Kemp ticket unfortunately lost first-time Hispanic voters to Clinton-Gore 91-7. And California, which Nixon carried five times on national tickets and Reagan swept four times, is now routinely written off by the GOP in presidential elections, partly due to the surging Hispanic vote.

Since Bush took office, his free-trade policies have produced a net loss of 2.6 million manufacturing jobs, one in every six in the USA. The textile and apparel industries in the Carolinas have been especially hard hit. These jobs have historically been the access ramp to the American Dream for blacks, Hispanics, single moms, and working poor. Is Vernon Robinson wrong to want to stop shipping these jobs off to China?

Our open-borders policy is forcing millions of our workers into a Darwinian competition for jobs with desperate immigrant folks willing to work for less than

the minimum wage. Unlike Jack, these Americans are not often invited onto the boards of Empower America, the Heritage Foundation, G2 Satellite Solutions, SmartCOP, Oracle, Hawk Corporation, IDT Telecom, ING Americas, Thayer Capital, or Thomas Weisel Partners.

After naming all the big men he met with in Mexico recently, Jack thundered, "[T]he best way to stop mass migration from Mexico is not to militarize the border." Did Jack ask his Mexican chums why they have militarized their border with Guatemala?

Before using derogatory terms like "reactionary" and "protectionist xenophobes," Brother Kemp might read a little more deeply into American history than Carl Sandburg's Lincoln.

The first act of Congress Washington proudly signed on July 4 was the Tariff Act of 1789. Abe ("Give us a protective tariff and we shall have the greatest country on earth") Lincoln was not only the father of 70 years of Republican protectionism, he raised the Morrill tariff 12 times. And, sorry to report, Jack, the old Rail Splitter spoke openly and often about sending slaves back to Africa.

Teddy ("I thank God I am not a free trader") Roosevelt called free trade a "pernicious doctrine."

Jack twice refers to America as a "city on a shining hill," Reagan's signature phrase. But Reagan slammed import quotas on steel, machine tools, computer chips, and Japanese cars and motorcycles to save the Big Three and the Harley hog—which Reagan did, God bless him. And as the Gipper said in 1983, "This country has lost control of its borders. And no country can sustain that kind of position."

By the way, Jack, the phrase is "a shining city on a hill." ■

[eastern bloc]

The Sun & the Dragon

The fantasy of Sino-Japanese enmity

By Eamonn Fingleton

WHEN A PARTY of Japanese men consorted with 500 prostitutes in a luxury hotel in southern China last year, the news made headlines around the world. The strange thing is that, though many of the men worked for a major Japanese corporation and were evidently on an employee jaunt, their employer was never named. Chinese officials professed outrage, yet they carefully hid the company's identity, thereby shielding it from a potential firestorm of criticism in key Western markets.

The episode illustrates a striking peculiarity of Sino-Japanese relations: although Chinese leaders delight in excoriating Japan, their bark is invariably worse than their bite. This pattern has long been obvious in everything from trade negotiations to territorial claims. It is even apparent in attitudes to Japan's World War II atrocities: the same Chinese leaders who publicly lambaste Japan's wartime aggression quietly shield the Japanese corporate and government establishment from vast compensation claims.

Although the American press has long portrayed Sino-Japanese relations as sullenly hostile, this view is at least 25 years out of date. Tokyo and Beijing quietly buried the hatchet in the 1970s, and in recent decades they have entered into

an increasingly close alliance. For the moment, however, it suits both Japan and China to keep this alliance *sub rosa*, not least because any frank acknowledgement of its existence could compromise their advantageous relationships with the United States.

American policymakers variously regard either Japan or China as the odd man out in the U.S.-China-Japan triangle, but, in reality, the odd man out is the United States. Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations have become so friendly that Japan is now actively backing China's bid to displace the United States as the world's leading superpower.

Unlikely though this alliance may appear at first sight, the evidence of its existence runs the gamut. In everything from trade policy and diplomacy to technology-sharing and education, the Japanese and Chinese are co-operating closely.

In making common cause with Beijing, the Japanese are motivated on the one hand by a conviction that the United States is rapidly going the way of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, they view China as a superpower with whom in the future, as in the pre-20th-century past, they can achieve a level of empathy they have rarely enjoyed with the United States.

All this notwithstanding, Sino-Japanese relations continue to be seen in the West as strained or even—to quote the *New York Times*—"icy." And Japanese spokesmen do little to discourage Americans from regarding Japan as a vital bulwark against a fast-rising China (a view propounded a few months ago by former Vice President Dan Quayle). Given that the Japanese economy is still three times larger than China's, Japan's ostensible anti-China stance is regarded in Washington as one of the few bright spots in an otherwise rapidly darkening foreign-policy firmament.

Any attempt to get to the bottom of the Sino-Japanese relationship must begin with some history. Conventional wisdom to the contrary, the Chinese and Japanese did not break off contact at the end of World War II. In reality, they maintained important links, not least in trade. (China had been Japan's largest trade partner in pre-war days.) Only when the Communists seized power in Beijing was the relationship severed, and the initiative came not from China, let alone from Japan, but from the United States. Seeking to pressure the Communist bloc, John Foster Dulles forced Tokyo in 1951 to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan as the true government of China and to join with Washington in isolating Beijing.

The estrangement continued until 1972 when, in the wake of President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China, Japanese and Chinese leaders eagerly resumed contacts. Almost immediately, Tokyo agreed to recognize the Beijing regime as the rightful government of China—a lead that Washington did not follow until six years later. The rapprochement gathered pace in 1978 when Japan and China signed a treaty of friendship. Then in early 1979, the new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited Tokyo. Later in the same year, Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited Beijing. The most obvious outcome was that Tokyo provided vitally needed finance to prop up the then shaky Deng regime. But the full significance of what happened in 1979 only gradually became apparent in later years.

For one thing, Tokyo adopted a strong pro-Beijing tilt in diplomacy, sticking its own neck out on China's behalf at several critical junctures. In the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, for instance, Japanese diplomats acted to ward off a threatened Western boycott of China.

They then helped Beijing gain full access to the American market for China's soaring exports. One stumbling

to Tokyo Michael Armacost, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa delighted his hosts in Beijing in 1994 by heaping scorn on American efforts to impose Western concepts of human rights on other countries.

When China pushed to join the World Trade Organization, Tokyo could hardly have been more helpful. Writing in 1996, the Japanologist Christopher B. Johnston reported that Tokyo "earned Beijing's goodwill with its consistent support" for China's WTO bid. To the open disgust of American trade negotiators, Tokyo left it to other nations, principally the United States, to play the bad cop with China. As U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky tartly remarked at the time, "By and large, the Japanese have not contributed to the creation of a commercially meaningful agreement."

In the end, Japan granted final approval to China's WTO entry in July 1999, fully four months before the United States and nearly a year before the European Union. Such promptness is atypical. In fact, Japan's normal style is to keep pressing hard for further concessions down to the wire. Japan's favorable attitude put pressure on the United States

Perhaps Tokyo's most remarkable contribution has been in technology. In contrast to its niggardly stance towards other nations, Tokyo has been open-handed in transferring key Japanese technologies to China, in everything from steel and shipbuilding to copiers and plasma displays. Tokyo's help in building China's semiconductor industry has been particularly important. The pattern began in the late 1970s, when Toshiba helped China make memory chips for the first time. During the 1980s, further chip technology transfers came from such Japanese high-tech companies as Matsushita and Fujitsu. Then in 1996, NEC partnered with the Beijing government in Project 909, an ambitious effort to propel China to the leading edge in semiconductors. The result, according to the American Sinologist Michael Klaus, was that in six years the Chinese industry shot from three generations behind state-of-the-art production to less than one generation behind.

Japan's indulgence of China's super-power ambitions has even extended to transferring nuclear energy technologies to China. This is "atoms-for-peace," of course, but Tokyo wouldn't dream of making similar transfers to, say, India or Pakistan, let alone North Korea. Indeed, whereas Tokyo has zealously punished both India and Pakistan for testing nuclear weapons, its response to similar testing by China has been little more than a slap on the wrist.

That Japan welcomes China's rise is also apparent in the way it has allowed Chinese exports to take an ever greater share of its markets. All official denials to the contrary, Japan still carefully controls its imports, which is why its overall trade surpluses are still three times larger than China's. Yet China is the only major industrial nation with which Japan has consistently run large trade deficits in recent years—as much as \$22 billion as

IN CONTRAST TO ITS **NIGGARDLY STANCE** TOWARDS OTHER NATIONS, **TOKYO HAS BEEN OPEN-HANDED** IN TRANSFERRING **KEY TECHNOLOGIES TO CHINA**, FROM STEEL AND SHIPBUILDING TO COPIERS AND PLASMA DISPLAYS.

block was Washington's traditional insistence that America's trading partners observe certain minimum standards in human rights. Tokyo sided with Beijing in arguing that human rights are a purely domestic matter that should not get in the way of trade. As recounted by former U.S. ambassador


to settle for a less than satisfactory deal. It also helped to quell U.S. concerns. After all, American policymakers reasoned, if Japan, which they (utterly wrongly) took to have the most to lose from China's rise, saw no need to press China harder on the terms of membership, why should the United States?

of 2003. By contrast, Japan consistently earns huge surpluses with almost every other industrial nation, not least such highly competitive export powerhouses as South Korea and Taiwan, which face significant trade barriers in many areas of the Japanese market.

In its aid policy also, Japan has long adopted a strong pro-Chinese line. Japan's aid budget is now the world's largest, and according to the political scientist David Arase, it accounted for two-thirds of all China's receipts of bilateral aid in the last two decades of the 20th century. By contrast, for all the talk of a U.S.-China "strategic partnership," China's aid receipts from the United States were zero. In the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, Japanese officials resisted pressure to cut aid as a sanction. The program was suspended for about a year, but the gap was more than made up by huge increases in subventions in subsequent years.

Tokyo has concentrated much of its aid on funding "muscle-building" projects that have greatly speeded China's emergence as an export powerhouse. Tokyo has forked over massive amounts in particular for improvements in China's antiquated transportation infrastructure, thereby providing Chinese export industries with the modern roads, railroads, and ports needed to serve world markets. In addition, Tokyo has supported Chinese investments in telecommunications equipment, air control systems, and other high-tech infrastructural improvements.

The Sino-Japanese rapprochement has also been remarkably apparent even at the level of ordinary citizens. Take tourist travel. Although the pattern in the last few years has been disrupted by the War on Terror and the SARS scare, China was one of the fastest growing destinations for Japanese tourists in the 1980s and 1990s. This in turn reflected high-level policy decisions in Tokyo: in



particular, Japanese bureaucrats manipulated airline landing rights and airport slots to stimulate tourist travel to China. In 2000, 1.5 million Japanese tourists visited China, up 41 percent in three years. While Japan's tourist travel to China multiplied 3.5 times between 1987 and 2000, travel to Taiwan increased by less than 5 percent.

Even more startling is the evidence of Sino-Japanese educational ties. In the 1970s and 1980s, most Chinese students headed for the United States, but in the 1990s they increasingly preferred Japan. So much so that, utterly overlooked by the American press, Japan in 2003 passed the United States to become the top destination for Chinese students.

The total of Chinese students studying at Japanese universities came to nearly 71,000—well ahead of a total of 65,000 at American universities. The Japanese total had more than tripled since 1993, whereas the American total had risen by a mere 44 percent. All this is the more remarkable for the fact that the United States has had a longer tradition than Japan of providing quality education to foreign students. It also enjoys a strong advantage in the English language. Not only is English the world's second language, it is easier for Chinese people to learn than Japanese because English resembles the Chinese language in structure, whereas Japanese is radically different.

One factor that has helped tip the balance is money. As far back as the mid-1980s, Tokyo launched a well-funded program to attract foreign students to Japanese universities. There is also a far more controversial factor at work: an increasing perception in China that Japan has displaced the United States as the world's technological leader. Chinese students know something most

ing up rapidly or even as already having become "one of the most open markets in the world." Such reporting has accurately reflected what Japanese spokesmen *say*. But in retrospect, such statements have proved to be far from the truth. Japanese leaders have inadvertently admitted as much. A top official of the Mitsubishi group, for instance, acknowledged in 2000 that as recently

presence in a few Tokyo supermarkets catering to American diplomats, American rice is rarely seen. Its market share is probably less than 1 percent.

Clearly the American press is exceptionally dysfunctional in East Asia. American correspondents typically take five to ten years to eliminate the many ideological and cultural blind spots they bring to the region. Few top correspondents stay that long, and those who do often become so thoroughly assimilated that they no longer identify with their home nation.

This phenomenon has long been a particular problem in coverage of Japan. Thus many of the most knowledgeable correspondents writing for the American press from Tokyo become—to put it politely—Japanized. They adopt a Japanese view of their ethical responsibilities and in common with Japanese journalists come to see as their proper role to act as mouthpieces of the Japanese establishment. Hence a pattern for the American press to project much Japanese propaganda into the American policy-making process over the years.

America's comprehension problems are not helped by the notable weakness of U.S. diplomacy in East Asia. Again the problem seems particularly acute in the case of Japan, where the American embassy often appears compromised by conflicts of interest. A notable illustration of the problem is that for many years, under Ambassador Foley, the deputy head of mission (the effective head of the embassy bureaucracy) was Christopher LaFleur, the son-in-law of Kiichi Miyazawa, one of the wealthiest and most formidable exponents of Japan's system of "money politics."

The problems of American diplomacy in Japan are not helped by the fact that for decades Tokyo has been allowed by the State Department to nominate whom it wants as U.S. ambassador. Tokyo generally selects someone who has long

THE FINAL DAYS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE **STAGE-MANAGED TO LEAD THE AMERICAN PRESS TO REPORT—COMPLETELY ERRONEOUSLY—THAT JAPAN HAD AGREED TO OPEN THE RICE MARKET.**

Americans do not: that such apparently world-beating American companies as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, and even Boeing now depend heavily on Japan for much of their most advanced manufacturing technologies.

It may seem amazing that the Japan-China alliance has not come to light sooner. Part of the explanation is that leaders on both sides see no advantage in informing their own people, let alone correcting misperceptions abroad. It helps that ordinary people in both nations continue to view the other side negatively (highly negatively in the case of the Chinese view of Japan). It also helps that, for various reasons, Americans want to believe that the two nations remain estranged.

In any case, Americans are remarkably naïve in their efforts to understand East Asia. The record shows this repeatedly, even on matters far more obvious than the Japan-China relationship.

It is worth reflecting on the monumental problems Americans have had in understanding, for instance, Japan's true trade policies. For decades, publications like the *Wall Street Journal* have presented the Japanese market as open-

as the 1980s the Japanese market was "closed and tightly protected." Of course, he went on to claim that the Japanese market was open as of 2000—but even that claim is hard to reconcile with the facts. It requires no more than a glance at Japan's roads to see that even today Japan's crucial automobile market remains highly protected.

A key reason for American misunderstandings is not only that Japanese spokesmen feel no compunction in misstating the facts but that important figures in Japan act out highly misleading, elaborately choreographed pantomimes to throw Washington off the scent. A classic case in point was in 1993 when Washington leaned heavily on Tokyo to open the Japanese market to American rice exports. The final days of the negotiations were stage-managed to lead the American press to report—completely erroneously—that Japan had finally agreed to open the rice market. Within 24 hours it became apparent that the story was a hoax. But few American media organizations ever corrected the record. To this day, well over 90 percent of rice sold in Japanese supermarkets is Japan-grown and, except for a token

been a key “friend” of the Japan lobby in Washington.

As for the hostile rhetoric that often characterizes the surface of Sino-Japanese relations, it is important to note that in East Asia more than in other parts of the world, political rhetoric is merely rhetoric. The truth is revealed only behind closed doors. Expressing mutual hostility assuages various domestic interest groups, such as the far Right in Japan and the anti-Japanese masses in China.

One thing in particular they both want to keep a lid on is the nature of the settlement they came to on war reparations. In sharp contrast with Germany, which paid more than \$80 billion to victims of Nazi atrocities, Japan has never paid compensation to millions of Chinese victims of its aggression from the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing has not wanted it to. Instead Beijing has negotiated a deal in which Japan has been paying large amounts of foreign aid in lieu of compensation to war victims. The deal has suited top Chinese officials because they largely control how the Japanese money is spent. But it means they have had to keep the deal secret from millions of victims and their families. For Tokyo, the deal seems like a remarkably cheap solution since a German-style program of individual compensation could easily cost four times as much.

There is often a lot of humbug in Sino-Japanese spats. Take, for instance, a cluster of bilateral Japan-China agricultural disputes that broke out in 2001. The goods concerned—long-stem onions, fresh shiitake mushrooms, and tatami rushes—accounted for less than 0.2 percent of bilateral trade. While Japanese and Chinese officials were busy talking up the prospects of a “trade war,” trade between the two nations was growing by more than 20 percent a year. Predictably the disputes were quickly resolved.

As for Japan’s pattern of periodically provoking the Chinese over its past military aggression, one thing is certain: perpetuating the impression of hostility disguises the depth of Sino-Japanese cooperation from the United States, which would clearly find it threatening.

Certainly the so-called Yasukuni issue—the highly contrived row over Japan’s honoring of war criminals—surfaces at times when Sino-Japanese relations are otherwise burgeoning. It first made news in 1979, just weeks after a highly successful visit to Tokyo by Deng Xiaoping. It returned in 1985, just as Japan agreed to transfer important nuclear technologies to China. It has resurfaced in the last three years just as evidence in everything from trade to student exchanges suggests the U.S. is being elbowed out of the U.S.-Japan-China triangle.

IN FIVE CENTURIES OF INTERACTING WITH THE WEST, THEY HAVE ALREADY SEEN FOUR EMPIRES COME AND GO. WHY SHOULD THE AMERICAN EMPIRE BE DIFFERENT?

While it is clear what Beijing gains from this special Sino-Japanese alliance, the benefits to Tokyo are not immediately obvious—but they are nonetheless substantial. Certainly the downside of Japan’s relationship with China is far less troubling than is generally understood. *Pace* the American press, China has not been hollowing out the Japanese economy, as a glance at Japan’s huge overall trade surpluses makes clear.

Less obvious to Westerners but probably decisive in Japanese terms is that China is a nation with whom the Japanese share an enormous amount of culture—not just relatively superficial things such as their writing system and their traditional medicine but their whole philosophy of life. A shared way

of thinking has, of course, not always ensured peace between nations in the past. But for two nations as xenophobic as Japan and China, similar thinking leads them to see the world outside East Asia very similarly. This in turn suggests that there are advantages to making common cause in diplomatic relations, particularly with the West.

Meanwhile, the Japanese see increasing dangers in perpetuating their “special relationship” with the United States. The Japanese take a very long view of history. In five centuries of interacting with the West, they have already seen four empires come and go—the Portuguese, the Spanish, the French, and the British. Why should the American empire be different? After all, judging by key measures such as trade (America’s current account trade deficit last year

exceeded 5 percent of GDP), the United States is losing position more rapidly than almost any empire in history.

Japan’s traditional pattern has always been to link with the reigning or coming superpower. For Americans to imagine that a past history of bad blood represents an impossible impediment to a Japan-China alliance is to miss the point. Both China and Japan are pragmatic nations that live more in the future than in the past, and it is not necessary for them to engage in a love-in for them to work well together. ■

Eamonn Fingleton is the author of Unsustainable: How Economic Dogma is Destroying American Prosperity. He writes from Tokyo.

How to Lose the War on Terror

A CIA bin Laden expert's lament

One of the striking things about the Iraq War is the extent to which American foreign-affairs professionals—intelligence analysts, diplomats, and high-ranking military officers—recognize it is a tragically misguided venture. Among the most recent to speak out is the CIA officer formerly charged with analyzing Osama bin Laden. Known only as “Anonymous,” he is the author of the new book Imperial Hubris—a scathing look at the way the United States has conducted the War on Terror thus far. TAC editors Philip Giraldi (a CIA veteran with extensive Mideast experience), Kara Hopkins, and Scott McConnell recently visited with the author. Here are excerpts of the conversation.

TAC: You've said that Iraq was the best Christmas present that Osama bin Laden could have possibly received ...

ANON: Have you seen the movie “Christmas Story,” where the boy wants a Red Rider air gun and his mom says no? Then at the end of Christmas day, when he has opened all his presents, he gets the gun and he thinks, “My God, I really got it. I never thought I'd get it.” Iraq was Osama's Red Rider BB gun. It was something he always wanted, but something he never expected.

Iraq is the second holiest place in Islam. He's now got the Americans in the two holiest places in Islam, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, and he has the Israelis in Jerusalem. All three sanctities are now occupied by infidels, a great reality for him. He also saw the Islamic clerical community, from liberal to the most Wahhabist, issue fatwas that were more vitriolic and more demanding than the fatwas that were issued against the Soviets

when they came into Afghanistan. They basically validated all of the theological arguments bin Laden has been making since 1996, that it is incumbent on all Muslims to fight the Americans because they were invading Islamic territory. Until we did that in Iraq, he really had a difficult time making that argument stick, but now there is no question.

It's also perceived widely in the Muslim world that we attacked Iraq to move along what, at least in Muslims' minds, is the Israelis' goal of a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. While we're beating the hell out of the Iraqis, Sharon and the Israelis are beating the hell out of the Palestinians every day. So we have an overwhelming media flow into the Muslim world of infidels killing Muslims. It's a one-sided view, but it's their perception. And unless you deal with what they think, you're never going to understand what we're up against.

TAC: I was interested in your analysis of terrorism versus insurgency ...

ANON: I worked on the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and watched the organizational structure and the ability of the Afghan insurgent groups to absorb tremendous punishment and survive, and then I worked for the next period of my career on terrorism, where the groups were much smaller. Their leadership is more concentrated, and if you hurt them to a significant degree, they cease to be as much of a threat. They are lethal nuisances, not national-security risks. Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist group but an insurgency with an extraordinary ability to replicate at the leadership level. When Mr. Johnson was executed in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi authorities killed four al-Qaeda fighters,

one of them named Mukrin. Within four hours, al-Qaeda's media enterprise had issued a statement acknowledging the death of Mukrin, appointing his successor, and providing a brief résumé.

TAC: You suggest that al-Qaeda would be delighted to have George Bush stay in the White House because nothing could be better for their international objectives. How do you see this playing out in terms of—this is totally hypothetical—a potential terrorist incident, somewhat like the bombing in Spain?

ANON: I said that al-Qaeda itself has said that it could not wish for a better government than the one that is now governing the U.S. because, on the policies of issue to Muslims, al-Qaeda believes this government is wrong on every one and thus allows their insurgency to grow larger to incite other groups to attack Americans.

TAC: One of your principal points is that this is a much broader war against Islam. How do you deflect critics who would suggest that Islam is, in fact, a lot more complicated? Countries like Malaysia don't really fit the Islamist or the fundamentalist profile ...

ANON: I don't know if we have to say we are at war with Islam, but I think it defies reality to say that a growing part of Islam is not at war against us. I am at a loss to understand how this far along into the bin Laden problem we can still be saying that this war has nothing to do with religion. It has everything to do with religion in terms of the motivation bin Laden, his followers, sympathizers, and Muslims generally feel to fight us.

Bin Laden's genius has been to focus the Muslim world on specific U.S. policies. He's not, as the Ayatollah did, rant-

ing about women who wear knee-length dresses. He's not against Budweiser or democracy. The shibboleth that he opposes our freedoms is completely false, and it leads us into a situation where we will never perceive the threat.

TAC: Unless we believe that bin Laden is rational, we are underestimating him ...

ANON: Tremendously. One of the prime examples of our underestimation is the whole discussion of Iraq and al-Qaeda. Bin Laden would not be very likely to deal with the Iraqis, not because he didn't like them, not because he hated Saddam—both of those are true—but because the Iraqis were a third-rate service. They are ham-handed, clumsy. Most

of their terrorist operations result in killing their own people. We have never seen al-Qaeda associate with someone who posed a risk to the security of their organization, operatives, or plan of attack. Al-Qaeda is a first-rate insurgent organization with a first-rate intelligence and counterintelligence service. Bin Laden has shown throughout his career that he deals with equals.

TAC: Can you give us a sense of where al-Qaeda is now in terms of popularity and resonance in the Muslim world?

ANON: We dealt al-Qaeda some serious blows in terms of its people who are designated to attack the United States,

but they have been succeeded by others who were understudying before those people disappeared.

In terms of popularity, it would be difficult to underestimate the growth in popular support across the Muslim world. Bin Laden has identified six specific U.S. policies that appeal to the anger of Muslims: our unqualified support for Israel; our ability to keep oil prices within a tolerable range for consumers; our support for people who oppress Muslims, i.e., Russia in Chechnya, India in Kashmir, China in Western China; our presence on the Arabian Peninsula; our military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan; and finally our support for Muslim tyrannies from the Atlantic

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to the Indian Ocean. Bin Laden is a formidable enemy because he has recognized what are deemed by many Muslims, even those who don't support his martial activities, as threats to Islam.

TAC: You suggest that the situation with al-Qaeda requires two things: an acceptance that this is a war against the major insurgency that encompasses a major part of the earth, and while we are fighting the war, we have to address the policy issues that have made the it happen. If you were the czar today, what would you do to make this happen?

ANON: I don't think we can win this war until we have a debate over what has caused it and recognize that it is in our power to win this war over a period of time or to fight this war forever. This is not a choice between war and peace. It is a choice between war and endless war.

People say we are going to do public diplomacy—magazines for Muslims. Well, as long as Al-Jazeera is broadcasting from Gaza and the West Bank live, 24 hours a day, no one is going to listen to the Americans. We are talking to basically ourselves and to the Europeans, who don't like us much anyway.

Certainly, I am not smart enough to formulate foreign policy for the whole

seem to imply a lot of collateral damage, which would undercut political efforts ...

ANON: War is what it was when there were cavemen or when Napoleon went into Russia or when we fought World War II. Collateral damage is a natural condition of war, especially when you are fighting an opponent that is uniform-less.

Why do I say we need to be more aggressive? We went into Afghanistan in October 2001, the estimate was 50,000 Taliban fighters under arms and 8-10,000 al-Qaeda. If we give the military intense credit and say they killed 20 percent of that number, 45,000 went home with their guns to fight another day. Why would anyone define that as winning?

It's a politically correct handicap to think that you can have a war but maintain a position where we don't want to kill the enemy, we don't want collateral damage, and we don't want our people to die. That falls in the category of analysis by assertion. You can say it's true, but it's not. It's never been true. Unless we address the policy issue, we have left ourselves with only the military option.

TAC: But when you have an insurgency that is organized like a terrorist group, it is dispersed and difficult to find. To destroy that group in a conventional mil-

I am not arguing that we carpet-bomb someplace just for the sake of killing civilians. What I am saying is that if you have an opportunity to hit the enemy, you don't spend a lot of time discussing if the evidence will make it in the Southern District of New York. Intelligence is not evidentiary material. It is information, and when you get to the level where you think you are not going to get any better, you act. That is something we failed utterly on in the '90s.

TAC: Do you think we could have pretty much gotten rid of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan at the end of 2001?

ANON: I think if we had been prepared to act on the day of the attack or the next couple of days, we would have dealt them a very serious blow. Bin Laden had declared war on us in 1996, but the military had absolutely no response ready. When they did respond, they spent a month destroying 30-year-old Soviet junk. From Sept. 11 until Oct. 7, al-Qaeda and the Taliban dispersed. And then when we did get there, we used surrogates rather than our own soldiers.

TAC: How important is getting bin Laden?

ANON: Of decreasing importance as the years go by, but bin Laden has a genius: he has the only organization of its kind in the Muslim world. He has Muslims from multiple ethnic groups and they work together with a lot of friction, but they work together effectively. We've watched the Palestinians for 45 years. They are all Palestinians, and they can't go across the street together.

Without bin Laden, al-Qaeda initially will lose some of its cohesiveness because of his very genuine credentials as a leader, but al-Qaeda is now a very mature organization. It is into its second generation of leadership, and the second generation seems to be more professional and businesslike. They're quieter. ■

IT IS A CHOICE BETWEEN WAR AND ENDLESS WAR.

country, but we must have this kind of a debate. We pursued policies for 30 years which have led us to 9/11 and which will lead us to further 9/11s, and unless we decide that we are willing to wage this war aggressively with the military, but also complement it with genuine political movement, we are in a position where we are going to be defeated time and again.

TAC: I don't understand how the aggressive military part complements the political strategy. Aggressive action would

itary sense goes into decimation of whole groups of people as a way to get at the terrorists.

ANON: It is a very complex problem, but I have never understood my oath of office to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution" and care just as much about foreigners as Americans. If I had to choose between the president attacking somebody and killing some civilians to protect my children and not doing it, I think I would support the president.

The Imperial Personality

Abu Ghraib was not just a privates' party.

By Justin Raimondo

"I'M NOT GOING to go down alone for this." So said Col. Thomas Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, when one of the detainees at Abu Ghraib prison died while being interrogated. The implicit threat—that if put on trial for staging the Abu Ghraib horror show he'd point to the real authors and directors in the Pentagon and perhaps higher—is very real.

So far, only seven lowly reservists face court-martial proceedings. The report of Gen. Antonio Teguba, however, named Pappas and three others as "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib." But the actions of military intelligence officers such as Pappas are subject to a separate and ongoing investigation, which has been delayed by the replacement of Maj. Gen. George Fay with a more senior general as chief investigator. Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, deputy commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, is taking over from here on out, much to the chagrin of Sen. John Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who protests that this will impede the congressional investigation. "Congress must be given the tools, the reports with which to do its proper oversight," said the Virginia Republican at a recent Senate hearing, at which he practically demanded of Paul Wolfowitz that the Pentagon provide his committee with an interim report.

The Wolf grinned and said he'd get back to him.

But bits and pieces of the story are coming out anyway as legal proceedings against the accused get underway. At the trial of Sabrina Harman, a 26-year-old Army Reservist, Capt. Donald Reese, commander of the 327th Military Police Company, testified that Col. Pappas personally ordered harsh tactics in "softening up" detainees for interrogation.

A photo of Harman, grinning obscenely next to a dead body, is one of many published around the world. She is charged with an indecent act, assault, and desecration of a corpse.

According to Reese's testimony, Pappas and his fellow officers, including CIA, were determined to cover up the death and hatched a plan to get the body out of Abu Ghraib and ditch it "in Baghdad somewhere." The top intelligence officer at the prison, Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, gave the order to "get some ice out of the chow hall," and the deed was done.

Jordan isn't going down alone, either. According to *USA Today*, he testified that he was being pressured by the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA to "pull the intelligence out of" the prisoners. So concerned was the White House about the Abu Ghraib interrogations that the prison merited a visit from an aide to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. As the casualty rate in Iraq skyrocketed, the administration was increasingly focused on getting better intelligence on the resistance, and Jordan says he was reminded "many, many, many times" of the need to crack the detainees.

Rice aide Fran Townsend denies all: she says she spent a total of two hours at Abu Ghraib last November, when many of the known abuses were taking place, but saw or heard nothing unusual. She also denies ever discussing interrogation methods with Jordan and characterizes his testimony as "ridiculous." Her sole purpose in journeying to Abu Ghraib, she claims, was to "learn" about the insurgency and to make sure information gleaned from detainees was properly shared among the various intelligence agencies.

But, according to Jordan, Townsend was just the go-between, an emissary from on high: he testified that Pappas, his immediate supervisor at the prison, said on at least two occasions "that some of the [intelligence] reporting was getting read by Rumsfeld, folks out at Langley, some very senior folks." According to Jordan, Pappas dated the intense push for actionable intelligence from "the very beginning," well before the interrogations descended into an orgy of sadistic perversion in the fall of 2003. Jordan also testified that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, was a major source of the pressure: "I know Gen. Sanchez was in our knickers to get more information from detainees."

Jordan's testimony immediately threw the investigation by the military authorities into a quandary: the two-star General Fay couldn't investigate Sanchez, who wears three. General Jones has had his three stars a bit longer than Sanchez, but

the switch will postpone the investigation and delay any possible charges brought against military intelligence officers and the interrogators under their command, while the reservists take the heat.

What can't be postponed or controlled is the release of additional photographs and videos out of Abu Ghraib. We have only had a glimpse of a very limited selection: dogs unleashed on naked prisoners; sexual humiliation; the hooded man standing on a box, arms outstretched crucifixion-style. But according to Seymour Hersh, without whom the Abu Ghraib outrages would never have come to light, these indelible images of evil, as bad as they are, pale before what is coming.

Blogger Brad Delong shares this account of a talk Hersh gave recently at the University of Chicago: "He said that after he broke Abu Ghraib people are coming out of the woodwork to tell him this stuff. He said he had seen all the Abu Ghraib pictures. He said, 'You haven't begun to see evil ...' then trailed off. He said, 'horrible things done to children of women prisoners, as the cameras run.' He looked frightened ..."

The source of that evil emanates, not only from the torture chambers of Abu Ghraib, but from what Professor Claes Ryn calls the "Jacobin" spirit that animates the War Party. His insight into the psychology of the neoconservatives' "will to dominate" by imposing global democracy at gunpoint is all too applicable here:

But 9/11 changed everything, the neo-Jacobins cry. Well, not quite everything. The human condition has not changed. Terrible events do not cancel the need for those personal qualities and social and political structures without which the will to power becomes arbitrary and tyrannical. Unfortunately, 9/11 gave the imperialistic personality another pretext for throwing off restraint.

The imperialistic personality—reflexively aggressive, unbearably conceited, extravagantly self-deluded—is really a form of mental illness. It is clearly visible in Sabrina Harman's manic glee as she posed next to a mutilated corpse, in the demented delight Charles Graner obviously took in his "work" as he piled naked detainees in a human pyramid, in the manic malevolence of Lynndie England's on-camera antics. We are told the madness was confined to the rank-and-file, but the evidence, as it comes out in the testimony Jordan, Reese, and others, indicates otherwise.

As more horrors are unveiled, and the testimony of participants points to the implicit consent of higher-ups, it is no exaggeration to speak of a neo-Jacobin reign of terror in Iraq. Just as the original Jacobins dragged their victims to the

While "Copper Green" may have handed Rumsfeld a victory in Washington's bureaucratic turf wars, there's been some blowback on the Iraqi battlefield: *Time* magazine reports that no sooner had many inmates been released from Abu Ghraib prison than they joined up with anti-U.S. rebels. A former officer with Saddam's intelligence service told *Time* that the jail had been turned into a *madrasa*, or Islamic religious school. "We studied hard every day and often into the night," he said. "There was one man who didn't even know how to pray. When he got out he was like an imam, and is one of our most ferocious fighters on the front line."

"Copper Green" was meant to crush the insurgency but instead fueled it. Rumsfeld's secret army of torturers, instead of routing the rebels, turned Abu

IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO SPEAK OF A NEO-JACOBIN REIGN OF TERROR IN IRAQ.

guillotine while proclaiming their fealty to universal principles of liberty, fraternity, and equality, so their present-day heirs attach a leash to their victims' necks and call it "liberation."

While the administration frantically spun Abu Ghraib as an "isolated" incident, Hersh dropped another bombshell in the *New Yorker*: Rumsfeld had approved a "special access" program known as "Copper Green," a secret army "which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda" and was "expanded to the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq." Hersh cites "several" American intelligence officials, past and present, as confirming that "Copper Green" utilized "physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners" as a strategy to stem the rising tide of the insurgency—and to fulfill "Rumsfeld's long-standing desire to wrest control of America's clandestine and paramilitary operations from the CIA."

Ghraib into a recruiting center for them. A more graphic illustration of the unintended consequences of interventionism would be hard to imagine.

Another potentially devastating aspect of the burgeoning scandal is the involvement of Israel. The Israeli signature—hooded prisoners, psycho-sexual humiliation, and soft torture—was in evidence since the first photos were released. But now the proof is in: Gen. Janis Karpinski, former commander of Abu Ghraib, recently told the BBC that when she met an Israeli interrogator at a prison facility in Iraq, she said, "Wow, that's kind of unusual." "No, not really," was his reply. Are professional sadists from Israel tutoring American greenhorns? This is a gift to al-Qaeda.

More Americans will die in Iraq as a result of Abu Ghraib and "Copper Green," but the blowback on the domestic front is damaging in another sense. A 50-page memo written by Assistant Attorney

General Jay S. Bybee redefines torture so narrowly as to exclude practically anything that does not inflict lasting physical damage. According to what will surely go down in history as the Ashcroft-Bybee theory of legalized sadism, torture “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” Does pulling out fingernails constitute a “serious physical injury”? After all, fingernails grow back. And surely rape hardly ever leads to organ failure or death. Mock executions, dosing with psychosis-producing chemicals, and sleep deprivation are all permissible under the Ashcroft-Bybee rules.

Ashcroft’s minions further opined that the government had “sweeping” powers to act as it sees fit because “national security decisions require the unity in purpose and energy in action” and these are the exclusive domain of “the presidency rather than Congress.”

Unity in Purpose, Energy in Action—a slogan that perfectly expresses the military leader-cult encouraged by our condition of perpetual warfare. It has a totalitarian ring to it that seems vaguely foreign, as if it might have been a phrase coined by Mussolini or some obscure Fascist ideologue. Certainly it is offered in the same spirit.

According to Bybee’s neo-royalist interpretation of the Constitution, the president, rather than being the chief executive of a republic, is a monarch in all but name. Endowed with absolute power, above the laws of God and man, the president, in this new framework, is the living incarnation of the imperialistic personality: a god, or a demon, but surely, in either case, not of mortal men. ■

Justin Raimondo is editorial director of Antiwar.com and author of An Enemy of the State: The Life of Murray N. Rothbard.

Moon Shadow

The neocons flee their quirky patron to feed off a richer host.

By Paul Gottfried

DURING THE LAST WEEK in June, the *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, *Slate*, and Fox News all ran stories about how the head of the Unification Church and the angel of the Washington Times Corporation, the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, had crowned himself in front of the Dirksen Senate Office Building as a universal messiah. Making this event particularly newsworthy was the presence of what Fox News called a “bipartisan crowd of senators and congressmen.” A now embarrassed member of this crowd, Rep. Roscoe Bartlett of Maryland, participated in the ceremony by carrying the reverend’s robes onto the dais.

I was not surprised by what took place or the vicious glee with which the media jumped on the story. In the late eighties I had been the senior editor of the now closed-down monthly *The World and I*, a publication funded by the reverend and staffed largely by church members. Moon and his lieutenants incurred enormous deficits putting out this magazine, which until the late nineties ran to 700 glossy pages each month. Despite the paltry monthly sales, which rarely exceeded 10,000, the magazine paid as much as \$1,000 per article. The justification for this investment was that the Reverend Moon, who I immediately learned was considered a divine personage, had recognized the “spiritual need” for a publication of this size. Mr. Joo, an amiable Korean gentleman,

oversaw our magazine until he became the titular head of our parent organization, the Washington Times Corporation. And unlike his mostly ceremonial participation in the corporation, Joo took a direct role in making sure that our contents “reflected the Founder’s mission.” He went over the copy with a fine-toothed comb and pulled items that he thought would unsettle his mentor.

From my impressions, a striking disconnect existed between the world in which the Korean church elite and their multinational following were immersed and the neoconservative journalists who predominated at *Insight* and the *Washington Times*. While the latter were busy networking with “Norm,” “Midge,” and “Irving,” and referred to the ungainly John Podhoretz, who worked at the *Times* and later *Insight*, as “Norman’s son,” the Unificationists were absorbed in theology. Whether trying to puzzle out in translation the Korean utterances of the Founder, explaining to outsiders that according to the Unificationist tract “The Divine Principle” John the Baptist had betrayed Jesus to the Roman authorities, or speculating on when the Millennium would commence in Korea, church members did not place a high priority on current events. My subordinates expressed views that seemed patterned on what the neoconservatives down the road at the *Washington Times* were saying. The two reasons they gave for being opposed to the communists, a

pivotal stance for the Unificationists, was that the reverend had had to flee from the North Korean regime and that the Soviets did not allow Zionist protesters to resettle in Israel. The first reason was church teaching and biographical fact; the second came from listening to neoconservatives at the *Times*.

What excited Unificationists were religious questions that arose from their relation to the church. Moon's teachings were the perfected form of whatever religious community they had left. Most of the converts I met, contrary to wide-

Funds he received from Korean converts, living mostly in Japan, and from extensive Asian and Alaskan business investments went into American publications he barely influenced. Minicons who hung around the *Times* cafeteria mocked him relentlessly.

In 1987, the *American Spectator* brought out a diatribe against the "theocratic socialism" and mind-control that it accused the Reverend Moon of practicing. This came at a time when the well-wishers of that neoconservative magazine were working and writing for

Perhaps these latest assaults were also partly occasioned by the recent decision to euthanize *Insight* and *The World and I*. Both provided money and jobs to neoconservative publicists, and it has been argued that Moon turned on his former beneficiaries in a fit of pique or because he really believes that the predominantly Jewish neoconservative recipients of his favors are Christ-killers. In "The Divine Principle," Jews are held responsible for the death of Christ, but since Christ in this text is seen as a relative underachiever and since Moon (to all appearances) is a more fully actualized deity, the collective stigma would not appear to be particularly grave. Moreover, the *Washington Times* has always supported the Israeli Right, and the commentary section features impassioned advocates of Sharon almost exclusively. If Fox News is correct that Moon does not like Jews, he has hidden his prejudice well.

Certainly this is not the first time that the reverend and his circle have done something out of the ordinary. In the late eighties, when abrasive wars of succession broke out among his disciples, the *Washington Post* played up these spats, but the neoconservative press kept away from the story. There were then still limits as to how far it would go to humiliate the Moonies while so many neoconservative jobs depended on the reverend's munificence. The *Weekly Standard's* reprinting of the *Washington Post's* derisory remarks about Moon can allay any fear that the minicons are still indulging their old sponsor. By now the "Messiah" is coming to resemble the medieval useless king. Those who used to eat at his table can despise him openly, without having to spit up his food. ■

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HAVING RECEIVED FROM THE **AUSTRALIAN PRESS MAGNATE** MORE AND BIGGER GOODIES, AND **WITHOUT THE SAME SOCIAL EMBARRASSMENT**, NEOCONSERVATIVES CAN AFFORD TO **LACE INTO THEIR OLD SUGAR DADDY**.

spread misconception, had been Catholics rather than Jews. Since the reverend had chosen their spouses and controlled their sexual, financial, and ritual lives, church members needed to believe that they had chosen their leader wisely. They believed they had done so without breaking from their ancestral communities, since Unificationism was imagined to be the culmination of what they had been before. Unfortunately their families thought differently, and most of the Unificationists I dealt with worried greatly about the opinions of their parents and siblings or about how to make their fragile marriages work. At the time that the Reagan administration, which they assured me the reverend supported, was plagued by Iran-Contra, their major concern was who would succeed their leader once he left this world. Several candidates, including a Zimbabwean adopted son, were then contending for the honor.

Although praised in the *Washington Post* for his business acumen, Moon seemed to be a naif, like his followers.

the Washington Times Corporation. No attempt, to my knowledge, was made by the Unificationist leadership to require its staff to sever relations with those who were taunting them. The most negative thing that I heard church members say about the *American Spectator* was that they were sorely "disappointed."

Fox News's recent unsubstantiated statement that Moon "claimed that the Jews started the Holocaust" exemplifies more of the same kind of bullying. It shows once again that neoconservatives love to hate the man who was their most generous benefactor before the arrival of Rupert Murdoch. Having received from the Australian press magnate more and bigger goodies, including a TV network, and without the same social embarrassment, neoconservatives can afford to lace into their old sugar daddy. On July 5, the *Weekly Standard* ran a spoof about Moon's coronation at the Dirksen Building taken from the *Washington Post* under the title "Not a Parody."

Scofflaw Sexuality

Gay marriage threatens to uncouple fidelity and matrimony.

By Peter Wood

IN JUNE 1674, Mary Tarbell, a servant girl in Ipswich, Mass., accused 21-year-old Obadiah Wood of “uncleanness,” which was to say, that she was pregnant by him. Obadiah admitted to having been smitten with Mary but had broken it off upon learning from friends that “she was a common baud.” After hearing from a dozen witnesses, ranging from 70-year-old Anne Reading to 13-year-old Anne Cotton, the Essex County Quarterly Court reached its decision. Alas, too many Ipswichians had seen Obadiah stealing away to secret trysts with Mary, and the court ordered him to pay a fine of 40 shillings to Mary’s employer, Samuel Hunt, and a weekly payment of three shillings to Mary herself to care for the child.

Every family probably has a few sexual indiscretions hidden away in its past. I am taking the bold step of admitting that my first-cousin-ten-times-removed Obadiah got what he deserved. The Puritan judges who nailed him in October 1674 were right, and it is about time the Wood family apologized for that “common baud” slur on poor Mary Tarbell’s character. (The court, incidentally, compounded her troubles by adding two years to her indentured service to Samuel Hunt.)

I thought I might as well get this in the open now, since I am about to venture some comments on gay marriage and homosexuality, and I know from experience what follows. I will be accused by some of harboring a puritanical view of the world, and a few will go looking for skeletons in my closet. So in the spirit of

pre-emption, yes, I come from a long line of Puritans though some of them, like Obadiah, were not especially puritanical.

I doubt Obadiah and his friends at their most licentious could begin to fathom what is going on in their colony today. The ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in November 2003 requiring the Commonwealth to issue marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples has recently gone into effect. After the court acted, a popular movement of sorts sprang up in the state to oppose gay marriage, and the legislature held a Constitutional Convention to moot the idea of an amendment banning same-sex marriage. But these steps were too little too late. The *Boston Globe* stood solidly behind the court; numerous politicians equivocated, and some forthrightly endorsed gay marriage.

As with some earlier national conflagrations, the match struck in Massachusetts seemed to ignite fires in far-off places. In this case, San Francisco; Portland, Oregon; Asbury Park, New Jersey; New Paltz, New York; and Sandoval County, New Mexico.

But some of the proponents of gay marriage in Massachusetts were not pleased with these imitators. Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank, for example, criticized San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom for defying California state law to issue marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples. Representative Frank argued that Mayor Newsom’s stunt was a “diversion” from the legal struggle in Massachusetts. Fred Kuhr, the news

editor of *in newsworthy*, New England’s largest gay newspaper, expressed similar worries in an editorial and followed up with an appearance on “The O’Reilly Factor,” in which he noted that large-scale defiance of the law by gays was unhelpful at a time when homosexuals in Massachusetts are invoking respect for law as the cornerstone of their campaign.

As a simple matter of public relations strategy, Frank and Kuhr had a compelling point. Indeed, the tide of public opinion in Massachusetts was turning against gay marriage. Under the front-page headline, “Majority in Mass. Poll oppose gay marriage,” the *Boston Globe*, on Feb. 22, reported that a recent poll showed a 10 percent jump in opposition to gay marriage in the state. The split was then 53 percent opposed to gay marriage and 35 percent in favor. And a commanding 71 percent said the matter should be decided “by the electorate in a vote on a ballot question.”

Did the antics in San Francisco contribute to this opposition? After all, the giddiness with which many gays were playing the Newsomwed Game did reinforce a long-standing but nowadays usually unspoken sense of the character of homosexuality: the idea that, deep down, homosexuals are not very serious people. They are, in this stereotype, folks who, having dispensed with one basic rule of traditional moral order, often don’t quite see the need to uphold other serious principles.

Of course, almost every stereotype, like a magnet, is linked to its polar

opposite. If “gays” are gay in the sense of frivolous, on one pole, they are tough, resilient, and exceptionally perceptive on the other pole. Discrimination and disapproval sharpen the senses, and years of self-doubt give the gay man or the lesbian woman a virtuosity of suffering that ennobles the soul. The argument of gay marriage as a civil right owes as much to this brooding sense of victimhood as the success of “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy” owes to the stereotype of gays as playfully uninhibited.

But it was the playfulness that seemed most conspicuous in the San Francisco lawlessness, and it didn’t resonate very well with how most heterosexual people see marriage. Britney Spears notwithstanding, most heterosexuals take marriage pretty seriously, and many wonder whether “gay marriage” is on the same order of moral reality as marriage itself.

One of the deep doubts usually remains unspoken, but is hinted at with increasing urgency: namely, that “marriage” isn’t really marriage unless it is rooted in the normative ideals of constancy and sexual fidelity. It may well be that some gay couples (and many more lesbian couples) conceive of their relationships in exactly these terms. But a great many do not. A widespread view among gays is that gay marriage should indeed be legalized but that getting married need not impede having numerous sexual partners other than one’s spouse. This idea is easy to find in the writings of gay activists, but most heterosexuals don’t spend much time reading such stuff. Here, for example, is activist Kevin Keith explaining why we would all be better off if “marriage” and sexual exclusivity got a divorce:

It is a given in the gay community that one-partner-forever hetero marriages are not necessarily a model for gays, or even a healthy model for straights either. As

‘sexual outlaws’ to begin with, legally denied the stereotypical relationship even when they ask for it, gays are in a position to look across the board and choose more freely. They have had the chance to think carefully about what relationships they most value, and try to find ways to make them work. And in seeking to broaden the accepted legal definition of marriage, not all of them want to stop at the obvious first step—monogamous marriage for gays—but choose instead to take the opportunity to create legally-recognized relationships that fit the various ways in which humans combine.

I found Mr. Keith’s statement in a blog by Joe Carter, “The Evangelical Outpost.” Carter’s doubts about gay marriage prompted several interesting exchanges and led him to assemble a handy guide to statistical evidence on the much higher numbers of sexual partners and the much briefer average relationship typical of gay men compared to heterosexual men.

Indeed, almost any survey of sexual behavior in America shows the same thing. The most recent example is a study titled “The Sexual Organization of the City,” in which a team led by Prof. Edward Laumann of the University of Chicago surveyed thousands of Chicago residents. In a part of town with a large gay and lesbian population, they found 43 percent of men admitting to having had more than 60 sexual partners. By any meaningful definition, this is rampant promiscuity.

But this aspect verges on the unspeakable in the current debate. It is easy to see why. To mention the eagerness with which some proponents of gay marriage look forward to shattering the link between marriage and sexual fidelity is almost certain to incite accusations of

gay bashing. But plenty of well-meaning people oppose gay marriage without any wish to vilify homosexuals in general. They have a live-and-let-live attitude; it’s just that they suspect that gay marriage is not merely about living next door to a same-sex couple. They harbor the uneasy feeling that the gay activists are engaged in a kind of bait-and-switch. The activists ask, plaintively, are we not worthy of the same civil rights as heterosexuals? But how much of Mr. Keith’s agenda is beneath the cover of this appeal to common ideals?

We don’t know because the advocates of gay marriage generally refuse to have an open and honest discussion of the matter. The “debate” proceeds as though it is an irrational fantasy of social conservatives that gay marriage will have any effect on heterosexual marriage. Will gay marriage in fact further erode the normative expectations that sexual exclusivity is part of the foundation of marriage?

Last year, I published an article in these pages (“Sex and Consequences: An Anthropologist Vindicates the Traditional Family”) in which I pulled together some of the relevant ethnographic findings. But I also noted that anthropology as a whole, like other leftist-dominated social sciences, has taken the side of the gay activists. I am grateful, I guess, to the American Anthropological Association (AAA) for its recent effort to prove me right. In February, the AAA Executive Board adopted a formal “Statement on Marriage and the Family,” which declares, in its entirety:

The results of more than a century of anthropological research on households, kinship relationships, and families, across cultures and through time, provide no support whatsoever for the view that either civilization or viable social orders depend upon marriage as an exclu-

sively heterosexual institution. Rather, anthropological research supports the conclusion that a vast array of family types, including families built upon same-sex partnerships, can contribute to stable and humane societies.

The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association strongly opposes a constitutional amendment limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.

I admit, I've only been an anthropologist for 25 years and, though I teach a course on kinship, I haven't read everything in the field. But when the main organization that represents my discipline declares that more than a century of anthropological research "provides no support whatsoever" that "viable social orders depend upon marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution," I am pretty disconcerted.

What could the members of the Executive Board possibly have been thinking? Was the "century of anthropological research" they had in mind the 12th century, i.e., when there was no anthropological research? Well, no, I suppose the statement has to be taken at face value, though that leaves only the unhappy conclusion that the members of the Executive Board committed themselves to a deeply misleading account of their own field.

To be sure, anthropologists have reported on many societies where homosexuality is more openly accommodated than it was in mid-20th-century America. And anthropologists have also reported on a few societies in which homosexual relations have been institutionalized, sometimes in marriage-like arrangements. My description in "Sex and Consequences" of the man-boy relationships among the Etoro of New Guinea is a case in point. And anthropologists have described societies in which heterosex-

ual marriage is cast in forms that are far from the norms of American society. The touchstone case is the Nayar caste in southern India, which, in the 19th century, permitted a girl to have many lovers, so long as none came from a lower caste.

The exceptional cases have, of course, received exceptional attention but with a result that runs strongly against what the AAA now declares. If we go by the actual facts, it appears that "civilization or viable social orders" do "depend upon marriage," and the kind of marriage they depend on is, if not "exclusively heterosexual," overwhelmingly so.

The only way I imagine the AAA could sustain its position is by playing Clintonesque games with definitions. The trick is in that word "exclusively," which would seem to mean that any exception, no matter how slight and no matter how bound to unusual situations and exotic cultural premises, must overrule a generalization that stands for 499 cases out of 500.

In other words, the AAA statement may be narrowly and technically true, but it is grossly misleading. By all means, we should examine the handful of cases where something like same-sex marriage is reported. But there is no plausible account of human society based on that handful of exceptions to an institution that is overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, heterosexual.

The AAA followed up its "Statement on Marriage and the Family" with a special section in *Anthropology News* presenting a dozen short essays by anthropologists on the topic. All 12 essays, of course, support the AAA's basic position. Linda Stone of Washington State University assures us that "same sex couples seeking legal marriage in the U.S." are doing "what people around the world have always done." Ellen Lewin at the University of Iowa admits to a transformation of her views. Once she had "a radical antipathy to marriage as a patri-

archal institution," but after her own same-sex marriage, she reconceived gay marriage as a way of moving "to the front of the bus." Diana Pash of UCLA reports on gay dads in the Los Angeles area participating in the life of their suburban communities: "Michael and his partner Frederick have become close friends with Kathy, a straight, divorced mother with an 8-year old son, Neville. Their children are playmates, and Kathy looks to Michael and Frederick as male role models for her son ..." And David Houston at the University of Vermont reports that the dire predictions made by opponents of gay civil unions in that state have failed to materialize. Tourism is booming and society hasn't collapsed.

The most arresting of the 12 comments, however, comes from the aptly named Philip L. Kilbride at Bryn Mawr College, who refers to his 1994 book, *Plural Marriage for Our Time*. Kilbride is a frank advocate for "family diversity" in the U.S., including same-sex marriage and polygamy, which he sees as "beneficial for children." He writes, "...all marital forms, including plural and same sex ones, arise primarily not in response to sexual needs. Rather, with few exceptions, these marital forms have significant links to childrearing." How might same-sex marriage help children? "Same sex parents' biculturalism may offer an advantage in childrearing."

None of the 12 contributors really manages to provide factual support for the AAA's misleading "Statement on Marriage and Family," but Kilbride probably comes closest by offering several examples of same-sex unions in sub-Saharan Africa. The Nandi of Kenya, for example, allow a rich woman to take a "wife," who performs wifely duties such as childcare. But the Nandi do not conceive of these women as each other's sexual partners. I suppose what is needed here is the recognition that not everything that takes the form of a

same-sex union is “gay marriage,” and, in any case, the principle of “marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution” was artfully misstated to serve the AAA’s polemical point.

So back to the question: will gay marriage erode the normative expectations that sexual exclusivity is part of the foundation of marriage? Anthropology, the discipline once devoted to the rigorous study of marriage and kinship around the world, might have thrown some light on the matter, but it clearly won’t. The AAA is busy churning out pro-gay marriage rhetoric, and even basic questions about the likely consequences of gay marriage for U.S. society are dismissed out of hand. Professor Stone says that gays and lesbians will “construct marriage for themselves,” and Professor Houston sweeps away all doubts about gay marriage as founded on “the sky is falling” efforts to “invoke fear.”

I think such declarations are dauntingly superficial. Gays and lesbians will indeed “construct” marriage for themselves, but in the process they are changing the building code, and it will eventually affect everyone. Contra Professor Houston, the sky isn’t falling, but when did anthropologists get into the business of mocking the moral apprehensions of the people they study? Were those Vermonters who opposed civil unions just ignorant and superstitious natives? Or might there have been some substance to their concerns?

My own view is that a society that institutes radical changes in the basis of marriage is bound to discover some consequences. But because marriage is an institution that unfolds over the lifetime of the family and is intimately connected with how children grow up and assume adult responsibilities, we probably won’t see the full social consequences for a generation. The cultural consequences, however, may arrive sooner.

The episode of Mayor Newsom’s gay

marriage assembly line at San Francisco City Hall shows one way this is happening. Against the backdrop of legalistic debates in Massachusetts over the Supreme Judicial Court’s gay marriage fiat, the spectacle of people defying the law in San Francisco, Portland, and New Paltz provided a much more dramatic story. Professor Lewin (she who had overcome her “radical antipathy to marriage”) caught the tone: “It’s hard to be against such dramatic instances of civil disobedience, even if one doesn’t find marriage a compelling goal.”

When it comes down to it, the gays who got “married” in San Francisco and the numerous others who cheered them on don’t care about the law. They are doing what they want regardless of the law.

And that message sticks. It is, of course, not just gays who want what they want. Eros is among the most powerful of forces in nature and in humanity. The ancients recognized its capacity to

principles, church teachings, Biblical injunctions, or feelings of animus against homosexual men and women. The secular, the de-churched, and the politically liberal are just as apt to sense that gay marriage leads over the horizon to a world where some basic social bonds will weaken and where the ungoverned impulses of the human heart may get the upper hand. Call it the Springsteen argument: marriage may not keep everyone at home, but it checks that hungry heart much of the time. Marriage in that sense is a law deeper than anything passed by a legislature or pronounced by a court. And “gay marriage” seems, by the intent of many of its advocates and the behavior of those now getting hitched, aimed at undermining that deeper law of loyalty and commitment.

San Francisco may have been giving us a glimpse over that horizon. Maybe many of those same-sex couples indeed aspire to be faithful to one another. But

PRESERVING AN INSTITUTION THAT URGES US TOWARD FIDELITY SEEMS A PRETTY GOOD REASON TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT GAY MARRIAGE.

steer all men and women into recklessness, and even the ancients of our popular culture (e.g., Bruce Springsteen: “Everybody’s got a hungry heart.”) endlessly proclaim the unruly longings that veer us from better-judged decisions. But that’s one of the fundamental reasons that human societies are organized around marriage. It is an institution that orders those longings for the greater good of both the individual man and woman and the society of which they are part.

Preserving an institution that urges us toward fidelity seems a pretty good reason to have doubts about gay marriage. It is a reason, moreover, that stands without the aid of conservative

the act of giddy faithlessness to the actual law—written and otherwise—was not an auspicious start.

As for cousin Obadiah, well, we all make mistakes. His society, 17th-century Ipswich, held him to account for his lawlessness, but intriguingly did not force Obadiah and Mary into a loveless marriage. A few years later, Ipswich also had the good sense to turn away the purveyors of the Salem witchcraft hysteria. Sensible people make good laws, and good laws make sensible people. ■

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The Kurds' Way

Shia majority rule pushes the Kurds to the exit.

By Bartle Bull

IRBIL, IRAQ—Watching the recent negotiations over the new UN resolution for Iraq was a little like watching Molière. There was something obliging and familiar in France's posturing about the chain-of-command verbiage and a cheeky good humor leavened the underlying cynicism. Just like France's greatest playwright, it was all good worldly fun and not especially meaningful.

Meanwhile, events of true importance were happening offstage. The resolution, which ignored Iraq's interim constitution and mentioned federalism in only the feeblest way, was a major victory for Shia leader Ali al-Sistani and a setback to minority hopes—most notably those of the Kurds—that participating in Iraq might be worth the trouble. Nor have things changed with Ambassador Bremer's flight from Iraq. Sistani, who in June wrote a letter to Kofi Annan forbidding any mention of the country's current constitution in the new resolution, has now turned the pressure upon his own government.

One of the first official communications Iyad Allawi received upon being chosen as Iraq's new prime minister was a "reminder" from Sistani of the Islamic obligation to see oneself as a trustee of the precious belongings of others. The notion is called *amana* and carries with it an obligation to sacrifice one's life in its defense. The implications for someone in a position as dangerous as Allawi's are ominous, and any tacit blessing in Sistani's communication cannot be separated from the implied threat that Shia support is not to be taken for granted.

The upshot of the last month is clear: Sistani has solidified his role as America's master in Iraq, and in return his country is a step closer to losing its only functioning administration, economy, and army. In Baghdad recently, a senior Kurdish minister told me, "We are getting sick of the assassination attempts and the Baghdad weather and the people who have no interest in a working government. We would be delighted to go home. We don't have to fight—we'll just pack up quietly and leave." Nechirvan Barzani, one of the Kurdish prime ministers, emphasized, "Iraq is a voluntary union. After 13 years of freedom, nobody is going to force us to do anything."

When Iraq's four million Kurds finally lose patience and call their leaders home to their safe green valleys, Sistani's Shias will constitute 75 percent of Iraq's remaining population, with most of the remainder accounted for by the Sunni Arabs. Such a cohabitation is almost too hideous to contemplate—a Yugoslav Republic with Tikritis instead of Montenegrins. Iraq needs the Kurds—for balance, for their experience of order and freedom, for their working economy—far more than the Kurds need Iraq.

The current chapter of this story began on March 8, when Iraq's *ad hoc* constitution, the Temporary Administrative Law (TAL), was signed in Baghdad. It was a big day, full of real drama as the Shias first walked away from a document to which they had agreed and then returned to the table to sign it into law. The TAL was to be Iraq's constitution until a permanent one can be drawn up

by the government that will in theory be elected this coming January. That constitution will in turn govern a new set of elections slated for the end of 2005.

Kurds in four countries greeted the signing of the TAL with dancing in the streets. Why all the jubilation? The temporary constitution not only affirms the principles of democracy and federalism but, most crucially, gives the Kurds (and anyone else who can command a two-thirds majority in at least three of Iraq's 18 provinces) a *de facto* veto over the permanent constitution.

Sistani, one of five Grand Ayatollahs in the Shia faith and the presumed leader of Iraq's 60 percent Shia majority, has been undermining the TAL ever since his people signed it. The Shias are a clear plurality in Iraq, and Sistani knows that any limits on straight majority rule abrogate their power—and his own. In the run-up to the recent UN signing ceremony, the Grand Ayatollah was adamant: the TAL lacked "democratic legitimacy" and was not to be mentioned in the new resolution. The Kurds responded with strenuous diplomacy and an open letter to President Bush emphasizing their special position as voluntary partners in the project of Iraqi unity and threatening to withdraw from the Baghdad government if their guarantees were abandoned in the new document.

Sistani won out—just as in Fallujah, where the coalition handed the city over to the Ba'athists leading the local insurrection, and in Karbala, Najaf, and other Shia cities where we have bought short-term quiet by ceding control to local

Shia forces. The insurrections in those Shia cities have been extremely useful to Sistani, emphasizing the precariousness of the general situation and adding immediacy to the horrifying prospect of more general Shia unrest.

All of this plays to Sistani's advantage. A policy, such as the coalition's current approach, that values stability over all else will always reward those with the greatest potential to cause trouble—and in this case Sistani and his Shias are the squeakiest wheel. As a result, the management of Iraq—a multiethnic, religiously heterodox state of 20 million people—is being dictated via hand-written fatwas and words whispered in the ears of the followers of an Iranian-born 73-year-old who rarely leaves his own house.

There are many opinions about the sort of Islamic state the Grand Ayatollah desires, but most agree that it is much closer to Iran than to Turkey. He has repeatedly said that Islam must play a far greater role in Iraqi law and society. Many Middle East observers have confused Sistani's reserved tone and "quietist" approach with a benign passivity, but in fact he has been extremely active politically—in Karbala and Najaf by scuppering America's plan for nationwide caucuses rather than direct elections and now in the abandonment of Iraq's constitution.

The card Sistani ostensibly uses is "democracy," by which he means a narrow mob-rule sort of arrangement that takes no account of the assurances minorities require. In 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the fledgling United States went through similar tensions. Big states like Virginia and Massachusetts wanted power allocated according to size. Less populous states could not participate on that basis, and the Great Compromise recognized their concerns by giving them equality in the upper house of the legislature.

Sistani's definition of democracy, then, is so primitive that even Washington should be able to understand its flaws. His real leverage, of course, derives from the threat of Shia violence. Appeasing him, however, is even more likely to destroy Iraq. While the country's Sunni Arabs are leaderless and demoralized, Iraq's Kurds possess the capability and the courage to walk away from the entire project.

From the start of British mandatory rule in 1918, through the monarchy and the *junta* of the generals and then the Ba'athists, the Kurds have fought to be free from every incarnation of the Iraqi state. Today, 13 years after the No-Fly Zone gave them protection from Saddam, they are strong and free. Their 50,000 soldiers are the only coherent domestic armed force in Iraq. They possess a functioning administration, a bustling economy, most of Iraq's water, a strong claim over about a third of its oil, and the preponderance of the country's agriculture.

Meanwhile, another factor, also largely ignored, is contributing to the growing thunder of a cataract ahead for Iraq's leaky ship of state: increasing violence against Kurds. Last week, a few days after the minister in Baghdad told me she was growing tired of assassination attempts, a cousin of Kurdish Prime Minister Jalal Talabani was gunned down. The man had been in charge of security for Iraq's northern oil fields, centered around the oil-rich, ethnic tinderbox city of Kirkuk, where I recently visited a Kurdish neighborhood that had just been hit by a Russian-built *Katyusha* rocket. The previous month, three senior Kurdish officials were assassinated in separate incidents in the city. In Irbil, the Kurdish capital, a deadly nail-bomb exploded in the bazaar when I was there earlier this month. The violence goes on and on, and the Kurds are growing tired of keeping it quiet and reining in an increasingly restive population.

As the violence in Kurdistan—as elsewhere in Iraq—becomes increasingly organized and sophisticated, explanations point ever more towards Iran. While the last year has revealed no shortage of native Iraqis who would rather destroy their country than watch it rebuild under foreign guidance, it is the unelected and increasingly unpopular mullahs in Iran who have the most to lose from an Iraqi transition to democracy.

Sistani's ties to the country of his birth go far beyond religion and sympathies. He has met repeatedly with Iranian-funded groups such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and is co-operating increasingly with Shia insurrectionist Moqtada al-Sadr. Whatever he might have to say about democracy, the Grand Ayatollah has every reason to deliver a choice between a unitary Iraq that ignores the federalism and secularism enshrined in March or an Arab rump in which the Shias are even more dominant and the mullahs of Iran do not have to worry about a free neighbor. If the coalition continues to help Sistani pack the Kurdish saddlebags, then division and theocracy will be our tip.

For all their good-faith efforts to participate in the theater of unity in Baghdad, the Kurds make ideal foils for the Shia project. For 80 years they have stood up to much fiercer opponents than any who are conceivable in Iraq during the next 15 years, so when they say that they are participating in that country on a voluntary basis only, and never at the expense of what they have earned during the last decade, the world had better believe them. ■

Bartle Bull's next book, about Harlem, N.Y. in the 1990s, is being published in 2005 by Public Affairs. He has written about international affairs for the New York Times, the Telegraph magazine, and the London Spectator.

The Progressive Peacenik Myth

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, American imperialism is, at its roots, a left-wing disorder rather than a conservative impulse.

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

A SEEMINGLY CEASELESS supply of new books and radio talk-show commentary in support of George W. Bush and his foreign policy give the impression that the only controversy in America worth mentioning involves patriotic Bush supporters and knee-jerk opposition to war by liberals.

Two arguments are being made here: that the Iraq War and foreign-policy aggressiveness constitute the self-evidently correct conservative position and that liberals are philosophically and historically squeamish about going to war. The first of these arguments has been addressed at length in these pages. It is the second claim, involving the American Left's alleged aversion to war, that remains to be overturned, for ever since the Spanish-American War of 1898, leftists have more often than not been at the forefront of calls for American military intervention abroad.

The progressive movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the tendency toward American territorial expansion and foreign-policy aggrandizement. Domestic reform and foreign intervention, to many progressives, were simply two sides of the same coin: just as an invigorated federal government would achieve order and social justice at home, an interventionist foreign policy would spread the benefits of progressivism around the world. "At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War,"

explains historian William Leuchtenburg, "few men saw any conflict between social reform and democratic striving at home and the new imperialist mission; indeed, the war seemed nothing so much as an extension of democracy to new parts of the world, and few political figures exceeded the enthusiasm of William Jennings Bryan for the Spanish war."

The Spanish-American War lasted a mere three months. The humanitarian aspect—namely, liberating Cuba from Spanish rule—was bound to appeal to progressives. And support it the progressives did. Feminist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton was typical: "Though I hate war per se," she wrote, "I am glad that it has come in this instance. I would like to see Spain ... swept from the face of the earth."

One of the war's outcomes was the American acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Once it became clear that the United States would not grant immediate independence to the Philippines, where a struggle against Spanish rule had been under way for some time, rebel fighters turned on the Americans with whom they had fought side by side against the Spanish. The result was a protracted conflict, known to history as the Philippine insurrection, far longer and more costly (in money and in lives) than the Spanish-American War. Forrest McDonald estimates that some 200,000 Filipinos perished, either as a direct result of the

fighting or because of a cholera epidemic that was aggravated by wartime conditions.

Events in the Philippines evoked concern and soul-searching among Americans of all political persuasions: what was America, born in a war for independence from its own European mother country, doing holding colonies? This was the question that the Anti-Imperialist League, formed in Boston in June 1898, proposed to ask.

Although a short-lived phenomenon, the anti-imperialist movement in the United States was an especially intriguing one. "It would be no mean task," says historian Robert Beisner, "to think of another issue that has united such a collection of Democrats and Republicans, progressives and conservatives, party stalwarts and independents, businessmen and labor-union chiefs." But for all their diversity, Beisner says, most of them were "traditionalists who believed imperialism to be in sharp conflict with established ideals and practices," and who continued to believe, along with such 19th-century predecessors as John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, that America's proper role was to "serve the world not through force but through the force of her example."

Although a few progressives were consistently antiwar, Leuchtenburg notes, "first and last, it was the conservatives who bore the burden of the anti-imperialist campaign."

This newfound application of the federal government's power abroad was bound to have its domestic counterpart. Herbert Croly, whose book *The Promise of American Life* (1909) was one of the most influential and revealing progressive texts, pointed to a connection between an aggressive foreign policy abroad and "social reform at home." He wrote that it was the war that had made Hamiltonianism—that is, the philosophy of a strong central government—once again fashionable at home. "Not until the end of the Spanish War," he wrote, "was a condition of public feeling created, which made it possible to revive Hamiltonianism. That war and its resulting policy of extra-territorial expansion, so far from hindering the process of democratic amelioration, availed, from the sheer force of the national aspirations it aroused, to give a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform."

Big government at home went philosophically hand in hand with big government abroad. As Leuchtenburg explains:

The Progressives believed in the Hamiltonian concept of positive government, of a national government directing the destinies of the nation at home and abroad. They had little but contempt for the strict construction of the Constitution by conservative judges, who would restrict the power of the national government to act against social evils and to extend the blessings of democracy to less favored lands. The real enemy was particularism, state rights, limited government ...

Half a century later, American conservatives like Richard Weaver and journalist Felix Morley could still be found who considered 1898 an unfortunate and portentous departure from the noninterventionist foreign policy recommended by

the Founding Fathers. They also sensed a connection between intervention abroad and big government at home. Weaver, described in George Nash's book *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* as one of the three most influential traditionalist thinkers in the U.S. during the postwar period, believed that the old America had suffered a regrettable blow in that fateful year:

One cannot feign surprise, therefore, that thirty years after the great struggle to consolidate and unionize American power [i.e., the War Between the States], the nation embarked on its career of imperialism. The new nationalism enabled Theodore Roosevelt, than whom there was no more staunch advocate of union, to strut and bluster and intimidate our weaker neighbors. Ultimately it launched America upon its career of world imperialism, whose results are now being seen in indefinite military conscription, mountainous debt, restriction of dissent, and other abridgments of classical liberty.

The idea of compulsory military training in America also emerged from the progressive movement. And no wonder: it contained the spirit of nationalism and of service to the central government that was so fundamental to progressivism. Theodore Roosevelt, Bill Clinton's favorite Republican president, endorsed it. Raymond Robins said that compulsory universal military training "will do more in one generation to break down class and section prejudice, develop disciplined, vigorous and efficient citizenship, and to unify the diverse groups of our national life in a vital Americanism than all other forces combined." (That the leftism of yesteryear sounds eerily similar to present-day neoconservatism is not to be overlooked.)

Woodrow Wilson's hideously failed crusade to "make the world safe for democracy," which contributed to Adolf Hitler's rise to power just over a decade after the president's death, was leftist in its very nature. Wilson proposed to fight not for specific and finite objectives like the defense of his country and people but rather on behalf of ideology and abstract principles. To those who feared that his proposed League of Nations would compromise American sovereignty, Wilson replied that he looked forward to the day "when men would be just as eager partisans of the sovereignty of mankind as they were now of their own national sovereignty."

George W. Bush is far from the first president to refuse to acknowledge an obvious foreign-policy blunder: when the disastrous peace settlement made perfectly clear that Wilson's grandiose visions for self-determination, "peace without victory," and world order—on behalf of which he had sent 120,000 of his countrymen to their graves—were as dead as could be, he simply denied the evidence of his senses and praised the Treaty of Versailles anyway. It was the "incomparable consummation of the hopes of mankind," he said; at one point he even called it an "enterprise of divine mercy." As Sigmund Freud said of Wilson, "He was rapidly nearing that psychic land from which few travelers return, the land in which facts are the products of wishes, in which friends betray and in which an asylum chair may be the throne of God."

Few were more bloodthirsty and savage in their support for total war against Germany than leftist clergy, as historian Richard Gamble shows in *The War for Righteousness*. Having lost whatever belief they once may have had in the orthodox faith, they nevertheless continued to think and speak in a Chris-

tian idiom. Except this time, Satan was Germany and Christ was the United States.

Historians have sometimes suggested that World War I marked the end of progressivism. To the contrary, the war in fact represented the culmination, even the fulfillment, of the progressive program. With the exception of people like Jane Addams and Randolph Bourne, the political Left in America was delighted with the war, not only because it was being waged for what in their view was

and organic forces for the more or less mechanical private forces operative in peace." Although war and social reform obviously had different purposes, "they are both purposes, and luckily for mankind a social organization which is efficient is as useful for the one as for the other." No wonder wartime analogies were so prevalent in Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, Lyndon Johnson's "War" on Poverty, and Jimmy Carter's energy policy (the "moral equivalent of war")—these domestic crusades

ing good liberal government in the South that would win the undisputed allegiance of the South Vietnamese. The National Security Council declared in 1961 that U.S. policy in South Vietnam would be "to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society."

Such war aims went well beyond anything that even Truman had asked for from recipient countries when aiding Greece and Turkey or defending South Korea against Communist aggression. But members of the liberal generation that went to war in the 1960s were exponents of what McDougall calls "global meliorism," an ideological model of global uplift based on American cultural, economic, and political models. He declares that "those who thought the war symptomatic of a fascistic 'Amerika' were wrong: Vietnam was a liberal war."

Novelist Graham Greene, who hated the war, was nevertheless attracted to the social-work aspect of the American intervention. "Our foreign policy must always be an extension of our domestic policy," he wrote in 1966. "Our safest guide to what we do abroad is always what we do at home." The American presence in Vietnam, he said, "had its origins in the same presidential impulses that gave birth to the Great Society and the April 1965 offer to North Vietnam of a billion-dollar economic development program for the Mekong River."

Since the 1990s, some on the Right have observed wryly that the political Left is indeed willing to use military force after all, just so long as no discernible American interest is at stake. This point carries a certain weight, to be sure; recall Robert Frost's playful description of a liberal as someone who refuses to take his own side in an argu-

HISTORIANS HAVE SOMETIMES SUGGESTED THAT **WORLD WAR I MARKED THE END OF PROGRESSIVISM**. TO THE CONTRARY, THE WAR IN FACT REPRESENTED **THE CULMINATION, EVEN THE FULFILLMENT, OF THE PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM**.

a righteous cause but also because wartime conditions would give them the opportunity to manage the U.S. economy and, they hoped, leave the free economy behind forever.

Shortly after American entry into the war, philosopher and educational theorist John Dewey exclaimed with delight, "this war may easily be the beginning of the end for business." Matters involving production and sales had passed from private hands into those of the government, Dewey observed, and "there is no reason to believe that the old principle will ever be resumed Private property had already lost its sanctity." The *New Republic* magazine, perhaps the chief repository of progressive thought in America, was pleased to see the massive increase in state control over the economy that the war had brought about in European countries, and looked for the same result in America.

The wartime spirit brought with it "the substitution of national and social

involved massive material and ideological mobilizations analogous to those of a foreign war.

Support for military interventionism among liberals persisted into the post-World War II period and into the Cold War. It was Harry Truman whose administration set the stage for the global interventionism of the Cold War. The false impression that American leftists have been traditionally reluctant to use military power, therefore, must come not from Truman but from left-wing opposition to the Vietnam War.

It is important to remember, though, that Vietnam was in fact the brainchild of establishment liberals. As historian Walter McDougall argues, Lyndon Johnson's Great Society had its foreign-policy analogue in the Vietnam War. In the attempt to protect South Vietnam's anti-Communist government from overthrow by a Communist insurgency tied to the North, the U.S. government sought to defeat the enemy by establish-

ment. The American Left by and large supported Bill Clinton's interventions in the Balkans, whose connection to American security and national interests were essentially nonexistent.

But this point can only be applied so far. After all, it was not Clinton but George H.W. Bush, during the waning months of his presidency, who initiated

ican security and the country's national interest. But just like Wilsonianism itself, the neoconservative conception of the American national interest is so malleable and imprecise that it can be called into service to justify whatever intervention is being contemplated. It has become for American foreign policy what the general welfare and interstate

It is rather a subtle distinction to make between a Wilsonian left wing that advocates global democracy as an end in itself and a right wing that advocates global democracy because American security is said to be best served by a world of democracies (since they are supposed to be so peace-loving). Practically speaking, what is the difference between these positions?

And for all their supposed realism, the fact is that plenty of figures who describe themselves as conservative, including Bill Kristol and Sen. John McCain, favored Clinton's intervention in the Balkans, griping only that it was not severe or overwhelming enough for their tastes.

That was no anomaly. "Humanitarian" rhetoric is never far from the surface of the neoconservative apologia: ever since the wheels started to come off the most recent Iraq intervention, the oft-heard refrain from the usual suspects has been to accuse their opponents of not wanting to liberate the Iraqi people, and to say that at least Saddam has been removed from power. In practice, Wilsonianism turns out to be the last refuge of the neocon.

In foreign policy, the typical liberal shares much more in common with the Fox News brand of conservative than the likes of Rush Limbaugh may care to acknowledge. The real ideological divide in America is not between aggressive "conservatives" and supposedly war-averse liberals, but rather between the bipartisan War Party—to which establishment liberals and establishment conservatives jointly belong—and the only real conservatives worth mentioning: the noninterventionists. ■

Thomas E. Woods Jr. is the author of The Church Confronts Modernity: Catholic Intellectuals and the Progressive Era.

THIS IS WHY THE TERM "WAR PARTY" IS SO APT: THE ARCHITECTS OF THE WARFARE STATE AND AMERICAN EMPIRE TRANSCEND THE SUPERFICIAL BOUNDARIES OF PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA.

American military action in Somalia, perhaps the most frequently cited example of a purely "humanitarian" intervention. Conversely, the establishment Left, along with the overwhelming majority of the media, strongly supported the recent war with Iraq, which was justified primarily in terms of American security. Hillary Clinton was still defending the flawed pre-war intelligence long after most normal people had grown embarrassed by it.

"Even today," admits neocon stalwart Dinesh D'Souza, "there is surprising consensus of opinion regarding Iraq within our national leadership. Even the *New York Times* recently reported that the Iraq policies of Bush and Kerry share many similarities. They both support the June 30 transition to civilian power, an increase in U.S. troops if necessary, and no deadline for bringing our troops home." This is why the term "War Party" is so apt: the architects of the warfare state and American empire transcend the superficial boundaries of party politics in America.

Neoconservatives typically claim that they are not naïve Wilsonians but hard-headed realists concerned to use American military might for the sake of Amer-

commerce clauses are for the U.S. Constitution: a term once intended to delimit government power that is now invoked to justify that power.

Thus the neoconservative Project for a New American Century made the case for empire in the Middle East in the name of American security. Yet the connection between the two is far from obvious, and in fact there is more likely an inverse relationship between American security and the exercise of American hegemony in the Middle East. Phase one of the neoconservative plan, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, has served American interests in no identifiable way. The United States is more diplomatically isolated than at any time in recent memory. The secular regime of Saddam Hussein, detestable as it was, was nevertheless among the more liberal states of the region. As many observers predicted at the time, in the absence of Saddam it may now be replaced by an Islamic state. That is what American security and the "American national interest" have gained from a conflict whose financial cost alone will surpass the cost of America's share of World War I sometime next year.

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*Fahrenheit 9/11*]

Moore is Less

By Steve Sailer

AFTER DECADES OF LIBERALS dominating the institutional media, where many draw a steady salary pretending to be objective, conservatives overran the entrepreneurial media, where a few can strike it rich being entertaining arguers. Michael Moore deserves applause for venturing out of the plush left-of-center sinecures and making a fortune re-energizing the feature documentary, a medium that had been as dormant as AM radio before Rush Limbaugh.

In 1989's "Roger and Me," Moore exhibited a fine, withering disdain for the common folk of his hometown of Flint, Mich., who no doubt scorned the youthful Moore as a smart-mouthed lardbutt-pinko-egghead. And what an extraordinary revenge Moore exacted upon his old tormentors—to make himself rich by duping NPR-subscribers into anointing him the authentic voice of the working class he despised!

Of course, the Volvo-buyers who went to "Roger and Me" didn't much care about laid-off General Motors autoworkers. I doubt if even Moore takes his 1937-style anti-business screeds seriously. They do provide Moore, however, with safe fallback positions while supplying the lucrative but tricky market for what white liberals do care passionately about: identity politics, especially their own need to feel morally and intellectually better than conservatives. (In May, for

example, hundreds of liberal websites enthusiastically fell for a hoax claiming that Democratic states have much higher IQs than Republican states.) So that's what Moore spoon-feeds his audience—reassurances of their own superiority.

For example, metropolitan Liberals support gun control for a hard-headed reason: to disarm the dangerous urban minorities who threaten them. But liberals hardly want to admit *that*, even to themselves, so they flocked to Moore's "Bowling for Columbine," a minstrel show about scary white rural gun nuts and the evil corporations that profit off them.

In "Columbine," Moore did ask one interesting question: how come Canada has many guns but few murders? Moore stared into the abyss of political incorrectness at the obvious answer—Canada is only 3 percent black and Hispanic—and blinked. It's so much safer blaming tacky K-Mart for selling bullets.

Moore is an admirably nasty editor of found material, and in his hit docucomedy "Fahrenheit 9/11" he assembles an amusing greatest-hits collection of George W. Bush's impression of a smirking chimp.

While adequately entertaining, "Fahrenheit 9/11" is, unfortunately, as ultimately disappointing as the Bush presidency. Moore plays it safe, laboriously hinting that nefarious corporate interests were behind the world-staggering events of the last three years. Yet, his allusions never build to much. Did you know that former President George H.W. Bush advises the Carlyle Group, in which the bin Laden clan has invested? Oh ... you did? Well, moving along quickly ... did you know that ...

Moore utterly ignores the administration's tragicomic infatuation with con-

victed embezzler Ahmad Chalabi to focus (if that's a word that can describe such a scattershot movie) on corporate connections, such as Unocal's proposed oil pipeline through Afghanistan. Sure, Mike, that's what the Afghanistan War was all about! Moore's strategy is both trivializing and eyeball-glazing, like a hate-Clinton muckraking documentary that expends most of its energies on Whitewater.

Moore has obtained illuminating footage showing what it's truly like to fight a guerrilla war: some GIs bust into an Iraqi house and tie up a young man while his womenfolk wail. The futility of our strategy of smashing down people's doors until they stop being anti-American has seldom been made more vivid. But then Moore starts yammering about Halliburton again and his momentum dissipates.

You can see why Moore chickened out on mentioning Chalabi. He'd have to explain who the swindler's American enablers were, and that might have split his target market of lefties into warring pro-Israel and pro-Palestine factions. It's much more prudent just to gesticulate at the Carlyle Group and imply they had something to do with 9/11.

Moore could have instead pointed out, more tellingly, that on 9/11 the new Bush administration had been cracking down on the ethnic profiling of Arab airline passengers, such as, oh, Mohammed Atta. Like Bush's banning of "secret evidence" in terrorist prosecutions, this was part of Karl Rove's outreach to minority voters.

But that alarming truth—that Bush endangered national security to be more multiculturally sensitive—is the last thing Moore's audience wants to hear. ■

Rated R for a twelve-letter word and some war carnage.

BOOKS

[*The Great Pretenders: The True Stories Behind Famous Historical Mysteries*, Jan Bondeson, W.W. Norton & Co., 326 pages.]

Not Quite True Stories

By R.J. Stove

"You try it. You try finding out why you're you and not somebody else."
—Ezra Pound

FEARS, AND HOPES, that the Internet would kill off the printed book have of course proven spectacularly wrong. Yet the Internet has certainly weakened the market for certain genres of printed book, and *The Great Pretenders* belongs to one such genre. A decade ago, it could have been welcomed as a chatty, always readable (though occasionally careless), middlebrow production well worth your local library's while. Today, it appears largely redundant. Given several hours' communing with an adequate search engine, every World Wide Web user can obtain for himself much of the book's information. The Net's ubiquity places on writers the onus of supplying value-added merits: the late Barbara W. Tuchman's narrative vigor, or Simon Winchester's atmospheric vividness, or Robert K. Massie's unfailingly elegant prose. A writer who fails to do this is, in the brave new Google world, pushing his luck.

Jan Bondeson here is pushing his luck. Earlier volumes by Professor Bondeson—who teaches at the University of Wales, Cardiff—have included an elaborate study of late 18th-century stalking (*The London Monster*) and an emetically comprehensive guide to the annals of premature interment (*Buried Alive*). After such indisputable originality, *The Great Pretenders* seems stale; it conveys

the persistent impression of authorial haste, of being a TV tie-in, although no such TV program appears to exist or to be contemplated.

Which is not to deny its virtues. Professor Bondeson concentrates on six instances of hotly disputed ID that haunted 19th-century imaginations: the fate of Louis XVII, the "Lost Dauphin"; that puzzling German *cause célèbre* Kaspar Hauser, who first emerged in 1828 and who mysteriously perished in 1832; the possibility that Tsar Alexander I, instead of dying in 1825, simply turned into a holy hermit named Feodor Kuzmich; posthumous rumors that George III (before inheriting his crown) married, and had children by, a Quaker woman named Hannah Lightfoot; the Tichborne Affair; and whether or not the reclusive fifth Duke of Portland (whose grandfather had been one of George III's prime ministers) abandoned his ducal estate to become a humble storekeeper called Thomas Druce. The professor's approach is judicious; he has avoided imitating the catchpenny junk that insists that the Lost Dauphin was really Jane Austen or that Elvis has for 27 years been kept a drugged captive on Planet Zort. He coolly assesses the arguments for and against each claimant. When medical questions dominate, he draws on his professional expertise to determine, for example, whether X suffered from

for the even less commendable task of "proving" that English artist Walter Sickert was Jack the Ripper. (Since Miss Cornwell's principal criterion for assessing evidence consisted of extemporization upon the theme "Because I say so," few felt much wonderment when reviewers mocked her harangue.)

The Great Pretenders' best chapter deals with Louis XVII. While this unfortunate boy-king is officially said to have died in solitary confinement during the French Revolution, an astonishing 101 persons—including John James Audubon and four other Americans—afterwards represented themselves as (or else allowed others to represent them as) the rightful Louis, miraculously escaped from jail. (The means of escape varied: sometimes a comparatively conventional vehicle like a laundry basket, though one enterprising soul bragged of having employed for his egress a rocking horse.) Among the 101 candidates, four stood out by their obstinacy and fame; but they have singularly failed to convince Professor Bondeson, or most other commentators on the topic, of their genuineness. Writing in the wake of Deborah Cadbury's excellent 2002 survey *The Lost King of France*, Professor Bondeson is undaunted by that model and contributes notable insights into the bizarre adventures of the juvenile monarch's embalmed heart.

THE PROFESSOR'S APPROACH IS JUDICIOUS; HE HAS AVOIDED IMITATING THE CATCHPENNY JUNK THAT INSISTS THAT THE LOST DAUPHIN WAS REALLY JANE AUSTEN.

tuberculosis pleuritis or whether Sydenham's chorea could have stricken Y. With those who burst into print while mistaking conjectures for facts he is suitably impatient. He cites in his closing section one Patricia Cornwell, who in 2001 abandoned her established profession of purveying lipstick-lesbian tracts thinly disguised as crime novels

As for Kaspar Hauser, despite his gaucherie and fondness for expounding improbable tales, he may have been the legitimate heir to the Grand Duchy of Baden. (Though if he was, so what? How many divisions did the Grand Duchy of Baden have?) The years after his decease witnessed the beginning of an extravagant Hauser cult, active even

now. One widely respected early 20th-century encyclopedia devoted almost a page to Hauser's non-achievements, while dismissing the rather more significant Edward VII in a single curt paragraph. If Louis XVII preoccupied eccentrics, Hauser demonstrated a rare gift for luring the insane. Abruptly appearing as he did *ex nihilo* in Nuremberg's town square—with, at first, only the most limited ability to communicate—he attracted much initial attention as a real-life Noble Savage. Other real-life Noble Savages (including Napoleonic France's "wild boy of Aveyron") had already captured the European popular fancy; nevertheless, Hauser's appeal lasted far longer than theirs and went far deeper. Sinister elements clung to him from the start, notably the philosophizing of his guardian and champion, G.F. Daumer,

a diligent student of homeopathy's founder Samuel Hahnemann. Considering that Hahnemann's hatred of Christianity verged on the pathological, it should amaze no one that Hauser inspired many brands of occult dementia, often repellent. Rudolf Steiner, inventor of anthroosophy, maintained that Hauser had somehow thwarted a diabolical Jewish plot to create a human being who lacked a soul. Other gnostics attributed to Hauser's early and violent death, "two world wars, the Nazi atrocities, the atomic bomb, and the division of Germany into East and West." From these apocalyptic assurances it constitutes but a small additional step (readily undertaken by crackpots) to the belief in Hauser as being literally identical with Jesus. Faced with such mountains of what Dr. Johnson called "unresisting imbecility,"

Professor Bondeson keeps his temper and tries to ensure that some of his madcap material makes sense.

Less interesting are Professor Bondeson's chapters on Alexander I's supposed midlife career change and George III's ostensible Quaker spouse, simply because both allegations remain so far-fetched. If Alexander really had faked his own death, the discovery of this fake would have guaranteed a succession crisis much more dangerous for tsarism than even the worst threats that the Decembrist rebels posed during late 1825. Besides, the hermit Kuzmich not only avoided impersonating Alexander, he showed active irritation when others tried foisting the pretender's role on him. These factors, along with Professor Bondeson's discussion of the tsar's physical health, do not make the tale of Alexander's great renunciation impossible—we

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are talking, after all, of a culture dadaist enough to have produced a Tolstoy and a Rasputin—but they make it improbable.

Regarding George III, the sheer quantity of negative evidence surely acquits him of fornication, let alone of a hidden bride. Devoutly Protestant all his life, he observed strict sexual morals, condemned his relatives' numerous lapses from such standards, and dwelt, moreover, in a London so awash with scurrilous political gossip as to have made long-term secrecy a hopeless goal. In Professor Bondeson's own words, "There is no contemporary evidence that Hannah Lightfoot ever met Prince George." The story that George married Miss Lightfoot first appeared after George had died. Those contemporaries who (often with justice) accused his kin of every vice would have been only too pleased to accuse George himself of a clandestine wedding. Somehow they did

not. Nor did the American colonists, who presumably would have salivated at the very notion of fastening upon the Royal Tyrant a plausible bigamy rap. Self-proclaimed descendants from Miss Lightfoot and her putative royal paramour—some of them voicing the tactless hope that Elizabeth II will abdicate in favor of themselves—have turned up in Australia and Africa as well as in America. DNA findings have shown, to date, no grounds for trusting such folk's proclamations.

The Tichborne saga makes for a somewhat more rewarding analysis. Bondeson's chapter is not helped by its first sentence's assertion that "the Tichbornes were one of the oldest and most respectable Anglo-Catholic [*sic*] families," or by the erroneous date of 1855 as the year of Sir Roger Tichborne's disappearance (it should be 1854). Still, the account here of the second Tichborne trial—which found the Claimant to be a scapegrace New South Wales butcher named Arthur Orton—packs more data into a smaller space than does almost any earlier retelling. It rightly stresses the disastrous impact made on the Claimant by his grossly over-ambitious, indeed feral, defense lawyer Edward Kenealy: "Determined to prove that the Claimant was really Sir Roger Tichborne, he [Kenealy] eschewed the suggestion that it would be sufficient to prove that his client was not Arthur Orton." (Curious, incidentally, that Professor Bondeson's list of Tichborne-inspired fiction ignores possibly the most celebrated example, from 1949: *Brat Farrar*, by the Scottish novelist and playwright whose pseudonyms included "Josephine Tey.")

At least the name Tichborne has managed to retain some public recognition. By contrast, the case of the Duke of Portland and his alleged alter ego, which rumbled on in law courts from 1896 to 1908, has slipped from the consciousness of all save experts in Victorian and Edwardian England. Professor Bondeson expresses surprise and regret at this slippage, but his own comments indi-

cate why it took place. The Druce-Portland Affair had a larger, more confusing, and less inherently vivid cast of principal characters than its Tichborne counterpart. Furthermore, the idea of an aristocrat longing for downward social mobility is bound to excite fewer people than that of a commoner longing for upward social mobility. In any event, the rise of socialism during the 1880s and 1890s meant a general loss of interest in such individual grievances as a purported long-lost legatee being cheated of noble estates.

A final chapter races the reader through allusions to other enigmas, the protagonists of which range from Jesse James (said by some optimists to have survived in Texas until the age of 103), via the Romanovs (apologies to Hollywood, but it looks as if they really did die in that Ekaterinburg cellar), to the Lindbergh baby (conspiracy mavens appear split between those who maintain Bruno Hauptmann's innocence of the baby's murder and those convinced that the baby was never murdered at all). Oddly, Professor Bondeson has omitted the more recent instance of Jimmy Hoffa, whom a tenacious urban myth credits with resting in peace underneath the goalposts of New Jersey's Meadowlands football stadium. *The Great Pretenders'* more serious faults include the overuse of personal pronouns, exacerbating the production's frequent air of hurriedly assembled voice-overs ("Personally, I think"; "I do not share the belief in the legend expressed by...") and—crucially—the total absence of an index. It would be hard to imagine a more obvious display of publishers' disdain for readers (or authors) than this last lack, which confirms the difficulty of recommending *The Great Pretenders* to anyone except mystery buffs with deep pockets. ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia, and is currently working on a history of royal impersonators who lived in England, France, Russia, and Portugal.

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[*Icarus Fallen: The Search for Meaning in an Uncertain World*, Chantal Delsol, ISI Books, 325 pages]

What Ails Us

By Mark Gauvreau Judge

DEAR HEAVEN, not another one. That was my reaction when a review copy of *Icarus Fallen: The Search for Meaning in an Uncertain World* arrived in the mail. Not another culture-war manifesto. I'm a conservative and love those books, but they have become more ubiquitous than the swarming deer population in Maryland where I live.

A week later, after I had finished *Icarus Fallen*, I felt like I had just seen "The Passion of the Christ"—twice. This is simply the best book about the problems of modern man since Christopher Lasch's *Culture of Narcissism*. It is so crammed with truth and insight that, as someone once said of Chesterton, every line deserves a review.

The author of *Icarus Fallen* is Chantal Delsol, a professor of philosophy at the Université de Marne-la-Vallée near Paris. Her thesis here is that man has become something of a Sisyphus (my metaphor, not hers). Having pushed the rock of his utopian dreams to the top of the hill, he has had it roll back down over him. The nightmarish ideologies of Nazism and communism, as well as the lesser sins of consumerism and the innumerable other -isms of the 20th century, have all failed to bring happiness. But the longing for utopia still prevails. And unlike previous generations, who lived through wars and depressions and were on close terms with death, modern man has attempted to cocoon himself in a nest of technological and physical comfort. Thus he is appalled when faced with a grim reality: despite all our efforts, human nature has not changed. Tragedy is still a part of life.

Rather than admit this uncomfortable truth, the man of today has erected new orthodoxies: there will be no disappoint-

ment, pain, or suffering, or somebody will get sued. Rights are ever expanding and sacred—"we suppose," Delsol writes, "that anything that is tolerated should be facilitated or even encouraged." Freedom is not to be curtailed in any way because there is no such thing as behavior that is normative for anyone. Absolutes lead to tyranny. This Delsol describes as a "movement from essential tolerance, based on an idea of the equal dignity of persons, toward a procedural tolerance or relativism, based on the idea that all lifestyles are of equal value."

Icarus Fallen does not name names; Delsol assumes that the reader will recognize the ubiquity in our culture of what she calls "the clandestine ideology of our time." There is no need to finger individuals, she asserts, when the theology of political correctness is in the very air we breathe. It is its own orthodoxy, with a specific idea of what man is—a person cut off from and not obligated to any tradition from the past, someone who can pursue any kind of happiness as long as it does not affect others, a man whose entire concept of self-actualization is based on ever-expanding rights. To say otherwise is heresy. "In our societies," she writes, "there are a certain number of political, moral and other opinions that the individual contests at the point of being marginalized." One must be for "the equal representation of both sexes in all spheres of power." We must consider delinquency the result of poverty. We must "hate all moral order ... [we] must equate the Catholic Church

the point of human existence is to expand human freedom. But Delsol calls attention to a basic truth that escapes even many conservatives: boundless freedom can actually make us less human. "[L]iberty, when exercised without limits, distorts and disorients the personality. And the individual, when excessively protected, is stunted in his growth Growing up with no other limit than the financial capacities of the nation, and in general even beyond them, rights viewed as entitlements ultimately make a society impotent; paradoxically, some gifts eventually impoverish."

The more we spend on social programs the more the public demands that they be expanded. As a result, people have become not more generous, spiritual and humane, but ever more greedy and closed off. And we have become, according to Delsol, hysterically intolerant of tragedy and even of limits. "When one is faced with danger, one learns why one lives ... entire peoples become known for their heroic deeds as well as their acts of cowardice." Limits point to the ultimate limit, death, which focuses the mind to the importance of life. Yet when the reality of the tragic is denied, and thus too the vitality of decisions made in light of eternity, man becomes "the plaything of circumstance."

Delsol is no ideologue roughly demanding that we blindly return to the old ways, embracing them without question. She defends, for example, the fear of certainty as largely reasonable, at least when based on the fact that cer-

BOUNDLESS FREEDOM CAN ACTUALLY MAKE US LESS HUMAN.

with the Inquisition, but never equate communism with its gulags." The virtuous are to be suspect, because "invariably they must be disguising hypocritical vices." The clandestine ideology "aims to equalize the value of all behavior."

Faith in absolute personal autonomy, commingled with the endless expansion of rights, is perhaps the most entrenched belief of all in post-Christian America. No one dares question the dogma that

tainties about what constitutes the truth have in the past led to pogroms, inquisitions, and even the Holocaust. Yet she admits that man by his very nature hunts for truth and meaning, for something he is willing to die for. Thus we find ourselves stuck: by nature we long for what Delsol calls "reference points" that direct us towards absolute verities, yet by ideology we are suspect of anything that can provide the answers.

These days, Delsol notes, we would consider Ignatius Loyola and others who forfeited liberty for the truth to be “demented.” In any latter-day liberal democracy, “all that can be said is that nothing is objectively true, since the object of desire resists all refutation, and tolerance has no place where desire reigns supreme. This sacralization [of rights], however, does not establish a truth in the philosophical sense, but rather the certitude of a general and unequivocal well-being.” Democracy as it is understood today “allows only for the certitude of tolerance, which is easily seen as the certitude of incertitude. In other words, democracy finds truth awkward, because truth always creates obligations, while democracy prospers in freedom.”

Delsol's chapters on political correctness include some of the best writing on the topic ever committed to paper. Who would have thought that anyone could wring new life from the topic, much less make it sing? “Dominated by emotion,” she writes,

[O]ur era overflows with treacly sentiment. It is almost as if the feelings that were once associated with a certain type of piety have contaminated the whole population Seeking the good while

remaining indifferent to the truth gives rise to a morality of sentimentality. Reactive judgment, deprived of thoughtful reflection, engenders fanatical emotion and an absolute priority of feeling over thought. In fact, it is not actually a question of sentiment, since sentiment supposes a historical and rationally consistent background. We are dealing here less with a reaction of the heart than a gut reaction.

Anyone who recalls the controversy over “The Passion of the Christ” knows exactly what Delsol is talking about. Yet *Icarus Fallen* has a flaw. It is the same one that afflicted the late, brilliant Christopher Lasch, whose style and philosophy are so similar to Delsol's: like Lasch, she lacks answers. Delsol and Lasch diagnose modern ills with preternatural precision, yet both are reluctant, or unable, to prescribe a cure. Towards the end of his life Lasch seemed at last to find an answer, or at least a system that embraced man's fallen nature and the danger of utopian fantasies, in Christianity—at least if his last book, *The Revolt of the Elites*, is an example. At the end of that book Lasch made an observation that Delsol echoes time and again in *Icarus Fallen*: “the key to happiness lies in renouncing the right to be happy.”

This could have been written by Ignatius Loyola, whom Delsol favorably cites in her book. The idea points to a Christian acceptance of limits and the notion that, as Lasch wrote, “human happiness may not be the be-all and end-all of God's plan.” We must, in effect, rein ourselves in. We must realize that we are human, that the reality of death hangs over every life, and that if we deny these things and attempt to achieve utopia by continually expanding rights and accumulating more and more toys we will warp and distort the very humanity we ostensibly are trying to achieve.

Delsol does not go as far as Lasch and, regrettably, does not provide concrete proposals at all. Her prescription for what vexes us is a call for “a new anthropology,” which is never very clearly defined, and the acceptance of our human limits—limits that we must admit will never change. (When asked to summarize the thesis of his massive work, Christopher Lasch answered, “limits and hope.”)

Delsol does argue for a revival of the idea that a plurality in a democracy can come up with a workable concept of the good and apply it to society without violating anyone's rights—however, she ignores the role of activist judges in subverting that very plurality, thwarting the new paradigm she envisions. She is a penetrating critic of modern democracy, and while she does not propose its abolition or even drastic change, she does call for the “transformation” of our system into something that more closely reflects reality and the good. Unfortunately she goes no further, leaving the reader to wonder what, in concrete terms, this transformation might look like.

Still, if *Icarus Fallen* provides no vaccine for the modern malady, it is nevertheless the keenest diagnosis to date of what ails Western man. ■

Mark Gauvreau Judge is the author of *Damn Senators: My Grandfather and the Story of Washington's Only World Series Championship* and *If It Ain't Got That Swing*.

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A Real Gentleman



This magazine has, from day one, been vigorously and patriotically opposed to the war in Iraq. But I watched in horror when the Palme d'Or at the

Cannes film festival was awarded to that unspeakable slob Michael Moore for "Fahrenheit 9/11." The French are too sophisticated to swallow the bull Moore is peddling. They applauded their detestation of Uncle Sam, *tout court*, as they say in the land of cheese. That Uncle Sam is more unpopular now than the old boy has ever been is without doubt. Some of it is envy, some of it is because of his unstinting support of Ariel Sharon's brutal policies, most of it because of the American government's plans of endless warfare against the so-called axis of evil. But people are not total fools.

The neocons speak with a very loud voice, but carry a twig, if that. We are not about to attack Iran or North Korea, nor Syria for that matter. If Moore was intellectually honest, his documentary would have exposed the sofa-samurai cabal of Perle and Frum, Kristol and Feith, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, and the rest of the neocons responsible for the mess in Iraq. Instead, his mendacious and grotesque farce of a documentary presents George W. Bush as having sold out to the towelheads and as someone totally oblivious to the suffering of both our troops and the Iraqi people while he concentrates on his golf. Moore is giving the cheap shot a bad name.

But I'm not here to talk about this particular slob. Like all very ugly people, he has an axe to grind. I'm here to tell you about a man as diametrically opposed to the slob as it is possible to be and still belong to the human race: William F. Buckley Jr.

Bill Buckley needs no introduction to us true conservatives. Of all the fathers of conservatism, he has been the most effective, bringing the movement in from the cold—a Herculean task for which he had to jettison certain people along the way. History will be very kind to Bill Buckley. His humanity, dignity, and sense of humor, his graciousness and old-world civility, his reasoned arguments against the terrible mindset of the ghastly '60s, have made sure of it.

Bill gave me my first-ever job, with *National Review*, and has played a big part in my keeping other jobs. Every time an outraged owner or editor was about to fire me over something I'd written, a quiet telephone call from Bill did the trick and the "poor little Greek boy" stayed employed. He has never failed to encourage me, has always included me in the *NR* family, and even turned a blind eye when Christopher Buckley, his then 14-year-old son, used to correct my copy and turn Greco-Germanic-English into correct English prose.

Now Bill has retired from *NR* and, like the honest and decent man that he is, has admitted that had he known the mess we were about to get into, he would have opposed the war. All I can say is bravo! Bravo for intellectual honesty, bravo for having the courage to say it. I have been waiting to write a defense of Bill since last April 7, when an article by a British hack by the name of Max Hastings landed on my lap via the *Daily Mail*, a British tabloid. Hastings writes the reasons why he hates George W. Bush and includes Bill Buckley as a "celebrated right-wing lunatic who recently took me to task in print."

Before I go on about how lunatic it is to call Bill a lunatic, a few words about Hastings. He is a very tall man with very thick glasses whose one ambition has always been to be taken for an aristocrat among England's landed gentry. It is his only ambition that remains unfulfilled, though he was recently knighted for turning traditional Tory newspapers towards the Tony Blair camp. He has always stabbed his benefactors in the backs, beginning with Conrad Black and Jonathan Rothermere.


Some time ago, the penny dropped. I noticed his blind hate against people like Sir James Goldsmith, John Aspinall, and Alan Clark, all three now dead, all three terribly maligned by Hastings. What the three men had in common was aristocracy of manner, great success with the opposite sex, and a great love of England. Hastings, you see, would have loved to be a great swordsman, but never even got close. Women, after all, are wiser than men. They could spot a phony Don Giovanni like Max a mile away. And they stayed away in droves.

Max's father was a hack, like father like son, and Hastings has never been able to live this down. God, what he would have given to have been born even the younger son of an earl or a marquis. Or even a plain lord like Alan Clark's father.

But it was not to be. Now Max tells us that Bill Buckley is a lunatic right-winger. Poor Max. Unlike his other womanizing targets, Buckley is monogamous, so why pick on him? But the penny has just dropped again. It's because Bill is a gentleman, something Max has never managed to become. Keep trying, Maxie. ■

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